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Sudan resists U.N. 'one-world' government
Labor, Dems revolt against Gingrich lunacy
LaRouche wins a delegate in Louisiana

**British monarchy rapes
the Transcaucasus—again**



The British monarchy rapes Transcaucasus, again

by Linda de Hoyos

Since the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall and the implosion of the Soviet Union, the British monarchy has roused its long-standing “sleeper” and other regional intelligence assets throughout the Islamic world and Transcaucasia, for the incitement of the bloodiest conflict ongoing in the world today. This geopolitical revival of what Rudyard Kipling named Britain’s “Great Game” against the old Ottoman and Russian empires, has been set into motion to ensure that this region of the world is plunged into a bloody crisis from which it would never arise again as a power capable of shaping world politics.


As this *EIR* report shows, this is the actual cause for the rise of fierce and ruthless ethnic and religious battles being fought—resulting in the deaths and dislocation of thousands of people—from the Caucasus all the way to Afghanistan.

Were it not for British geopolitical nihilism, the year 1989 would have seen the opening up of the entire vast area of Central Asia, bringing the sealed-off and depressed republics of the former Soviet Union, into communication with the rest of the world. The opportunity had emerged to revive the economies and cities of Central Asia, which, before Genghis Khan ripped through it, had been the cross-roads of civilization, the locus of fabulous cities whose leaders had accumulated vast libraries of the knowledge known to mankind.

A strategy of *winning the peace* of the Cold War would have seized upon this opportunity, as the American statesman and current Presidential candidate Lyndon LaRouche did. As LaRouche proposed, the development of Central Asia would hinge on: the construction of the Eurasian land-bridge—railroad and industrial development corridor lines—that would link Beijing and the Far East to Europe and the Middle East (see **Map 16**). This program would be carried out in concert

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Caucasus, Central Asian conflict zones



Instigated conflicts, or potential conflicts, have so far blocked Central Asia's development as the crossroads for Asia and Europe, as conceived in LaRouche's proposal for a new "Silk Route." Conflicts in the Caucasus (1) block the needed rail lines from Europe and European Russia to the Mideast. The Kurdish conflict (2) blocks another European route to the Mideast and Asia. The continuing war in Afghanistan (3), ongoing and threatened civil war in Tajikistan and elsewhere in Central Asia (4), and potential insurgency in Xinjiang province, China (5) block the main required rail-development corridors linking China to the Mideast and Europe through Central Asia.

with the high-technology infrastructural construction of what LaRouche called the "European Productive Triangle," formed by the vertices of Paris, Berlin, and Vienna. The Productive Triangle, in turn, would be the fulcrum for development of Russia and China, in alliance with the United States—as Franklin Delano Roosevelt had envisioned a postwar world in 1944.

Secondly, the determination to carry out such a policy would have called into being the combination of national governments that could force through the creation of a new monetary system dedicated to serving this development endeavor, replacing the bankrupt Bretton Woods system, which threatens to explode in the biggest financial blowout in history.

This potential, however, poses a mortal strategic danger to the British monarchy, as the *primus inter pares* of the globe's financial oligarchy. This is why British intelligence, which has accrued many assets from its long historical presence in this region (see **Maps 3, 7, 8, 9, 12**), has stirred up every potential conflict in Central Asia, turning the area into a cockpit of destabilization that threatens to spill over into Russia, China, and India.

London's strategic concept is identical to that which produced the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Balkan war, as the most efficient means to prevent the integration of the

western and eastern European economies for reindustrialization.

It is useful to visualize British intelligence's current operations in Central Asia as a series of map overlays.

The first overlay shows that British-instigated ethnic conflicts have virtually closed off Central Asia as effectively as if the Iron Curtain were still standing (**Map 1**):

- The widening wars in the Caucasus on the western side of the Caspian Sea have bolted the gateway from Central Asia into the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.
- The continuing war in Afghanistan, which has generated a brutal war in Tajikistan, has shut the gateway from Central Asia and Asia into the Indian Ocean and Middle East.
- In the midst of this turmoil, Britain is luring Turkey into an "imperial mode," its capabilities to be used as a support structure for Turkic insurgencies. Thus, instead of being the natural trade and economic crossroads between Central Asia and Europe, Turkey is to become the ideological and logistical supply base for insurgencies aimed at Russia and China, in particular.

Another map overlay would show that in each case, British intelligence is employing its roving band of incendiaries, the afghansi—a creation of London from the outset. This pool of excess but ideologically motivated labor is being deployed as either fighting forces, as in the Caucasus and Tajikistan; or

Case file: Chechen rebel leader Dudayev

The highest-ranking Chechen in the history of the Soviet military, Gen. Jokhar Dudayev is a veteran of the Afghan war, where he led the Soviet Air Force and introduced the tactic of carpet bombing against the Afghan population. He is now a leader of the Chechen secessionist armed insurrection against Russia, with recruits of veteran Afghan mujahideen.

Since 1992, when General Dudayev seized power in Chechnya, Grozny has become a central depot for drugs from Afghanistan and Central Asia. Dudayev's brother Bek-Murzy is reputedly one of the ringleaders of the Chechen mafia. Dudayev is reportedly a weapons-for-drugs partner with leading afghansi drug lord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher supports the Chechen secessionist cause "100%," according to Dudayev's representative in the United States. "George Bush and the Republicans were certainly more sympathetic to Chechen independence than Clinton," he added.

as terrorists to blackmail potentially restive allies, such as France; or to target allies of the United States, such as Pakistan and the Philippines; or to create potential nuclear strategic crises, as in Kashmir.

The last overlay shows the most insidious feature of the "Great Game" now in play. From the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, through Central Asia, up through the Caucasus, the region has been inundated with drug production and hot money (see **Maps 18, 19, 20, 21**). The routes traveled by the drugs from their point of production to their markets, are identical to the passage of the afghansi terrorists. The drug trade brings in tow the proliferation of local mafiosi and drug lords who have no loyalties to nation or government, and threaten to overwhelm any national political institution. The drug trade is the real cause of the gang wars in Karachi, Pakistan, and Afghanistan-Tajikistan; it supplies the war in the Caucasus; it threatens to crush any government that might attempt to resist Thatcherite "globalization."

Or, as Bernard Lewis, the British intelligence godfather of the "arc of crisis" policy against the Soviet Union, forecast in his 1992 article for *Foreign Affairs* magazine, "Lebanonization" will soon threaten Central Asia, fueled by religious and ethnic civil strife: "If the central power is sufficiently weakened, there is no real civil society to hold the polity

together, no real sense of common national identity or overriding allegiance to the nation-state. The state then disintegrates—as happened in Lebanon—into a chaos of squabbling, feuding, fighting sects, tribes, regions, and parties."

The strategic boomerang

The ultimate goal of such planned disintegration is not only the "denial of territory" of Central Asia for any constructive purpose, but to use the centrifugal forces of instability and corruption to knock at the doors of Beijing and Moscow. Viewing the escalating encroachment against their political and territorial sovereignty, the leaderships in Beijing and Moscow are expected by British intelligence to revert to a "Cold War" stance. The eastern bloc, again, is to be driven against London's primary enemy, the United States. It is the unique power of the United States to give leadership to nation-building, that poses the gravest threat to the British monarchy.

Hence, the specter that the United States would emerge from World War II's victory to sponsor decolonization and industrialization using the enormous potential of the United States to lead the way for global industrialization was "put back in the bottle," with Bertrand Russell's operation for the U.S. atom-bombing of Japan, followed by the 1946 "Iron Curtain" speech of Margaret Thatcher's inspirational predecessor, Winston Churchill. British intelligence, acting on behalf of the Malthusian oligarchy, cannot function in a universe dominated by a "community of principle" among sovereign nation-states, dedicated to mutual development. The world, as London views things from its strange perch, must be divided into imperial blocs. Then London is afforded the opportunity to operate "between the cracks," to act as the whispering go-between manipulating all sides—the Venetian model.

Or, as David Urquhart, one of Britain's champion players of the Great Game, accurately remarked in 1848 to Daniel Manin, president of the Venetian Republic: "Venice made Diplomacy the very foundation of her State, and therefore, small as she was, she obtained ascendancy over modern potentates. In Modern Europe, Diplomacy is in truth unknown, yet the whispers of diplomatists are all powerful. Secret enclaves rule the world, and the nations neither know why or how."

Today, under conditions of global financial and economic collapse, it is all the more urgent that London's geopolitics become the fundamental axiom of "diplomacy," or else the instability caused by the crisis itself could force the emergence of alternative solutions based on nation-states, as LaRouche has described today's strategic *opportunity* for humanity.

Therefore, British intelligence has gone back into its history libraries, dusted off the census index-card profiles of tribes, clans, families, and individuals that its officers so

assiduously collected during the Empire days, and called into play again the "Great Game."

British intelligence doesn't simply hand down orders to underling-agents for its operations; it rather relies on the method of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke—pulling the string of passion and ideology of the subject-victim. This was the method used with great success, for example, by the Colonial India Bureau, the model for Wilfred Blunt's Arab Bureau later. In India, the British managed to create animosities among peoples—Hindu versus Muslim versus Sikh—that had never existed before the "Raj." The idea is to set people against each other by inculcating ideologies based on the most narrowly defined religious, ethnic, or territorial imperatives. Where such ideologies do not exist, create them from whole cloth; where they already exist, cultivate and exacerbate them. Use provocateurs and whisper campaigns to provoke the requisite reactions of violent paranoia.

This method was used to great effect also by Lord Palmerston, British foreign and prime minister for 35 years.


Through his agents such as Giuseppe Mazzini and David Urquhart, Palmerston created a virtual zoo of ethnic identities, forging them into well-oiled populist organizations such as "Young Hungary," "Young Poland," "Young Italy," and "Young Germany," that unleashed the 1848 revolution across Europe. His targets were the Russian, Ottoman, and Austrian empires. Urquhart's organizing of the Circassian tribes in uprisings against Russia—still recalled with fondness today in Chechnya—is a case in point. Palmerston's goal to "trim back" the Russian Empire was also the motivation for Urquhart's intellectual and financial nurturing of Karl Marx, who targeted the Russian monarchy that would support Abraham Lincoln against Britain during the American Civil War (see Case File Karl Marx).

Later in the nineteenth century, the Great Game passed from Urquhart's hands to those of British intelligence game-master Wilfred Scawen Blunt, who formed the Arab Bureau with the stated purpose "to organize an Islamic revolutionary alliance with the British Empire"—aimed at both the Russian and Ottoman empires. As his hireling al-Afghani argued the

MAP 2

Countries of the former Soviet Union





In the nineteenth century, Britain's Lord Palmerston (left) employed such agents as Giuseppe Mazzini (above left) to create a veritable zoo of ethnic and other insurgencies. One of his principal operatives, David Urquhart, was the controller of Karl Marx (above right).

strategic case, "Then the Mollahs would preach a jihad to join you [London] against the Russians."

Decades of work came to fruition with World War I. The famed socialist grain speculator Alexander Helphand (Parvus) followed in Urquhart's footsteps, to instigate revolt against Russia, this time under Marx's ideological mantle; and against Turkey, under a revival of Urquhart's Young Ottomans. The Caucasus, which came under direct British military occupation, was detonated yet again. The chaotic disintegration of the empires of the east, in conjunction with the revenge policy of Versailles, set the world on the path to World War II.

The 'Great Game' today

Now, London has hauled out the Great Game again—under a new name, the "Arc of Crisis." The choice of this strategic option was signaled by the 1979 overthrow of the Shah of Iran, by British intelligence with the complicity of the Carter administration in the United States, and the orchestrated rise of Ayatollah Khomeini, a latter-day rendition of Wilfred Blunt's al-Afghani. The policy, whose intellectual promoter was Bernard Lewis of London University and then Princeton University, was incorporated as U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. "Islamic fundamentalism is a bulwark against communism," enthused Carter's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.

The dual funding of both sides in the Iran-Iraq war further extended the Arc of Crisis.

The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan afforded the British their next opportunity to foment the Islamic revolt against Russia. This time, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Lord Nicholas Bethell roped the Reagan-Bush administration into shelling out billions of dollars—officially and covertly—to fund the creation of the afghansi—the drug-production-fueled warlords of Afghanistan.

In October 1984, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, a personal friend of Lyndon LaRouche, was murdered by British-backed Sikh terrorists, thus removing a major impediment to British designs in the region.

Under Lewis's Arc of Crisis plan, not only would the Soviet Union fall to pieces, but all the countries of the region—from the Mideast to Central Asia to the Indian subcontinent—would crack up into their "constituent" parts: Push-tunistan out of Afghanistan and Pakistan; Azerbaijan out of the Soviet Union and Iran; Kurdistan out of Iraq, Turkey, and Iran; Baluchistan out of Pakistan and Iran; Arabistan out of Iran; Persia out of Central Asia; Turkmenistan out of Iran, Russia, and China; Khalistan out of Pakistan and India; independent Kashmir out of India and Pakistan; and the Sindh out of Pakistan.

In this way, the nation-states of the region would be destroyed, replaced by powerless satraps of British intelligence and finance.

In pursuit of this plan, the entire region stretching from Bangladesh to Grozny has become a tinderbox, its conflagration spreading in wider circles. After the fall of the Soviet

Union, U.S. President George Bush and British Prime Minister Thatcher, squandering the greatest opportunity for world peace in this century, launched the looting blitzkrieg against Russia and eastern Europe under the authority of the International Monetary Fund, disastrously continued so far by the Clinton administration. Between the IMF and British incitements against Russia and China, the eventual hostile reaction of Moscow and Beijing is virtually guaranteed, and with it, the emergence of a new Cold War. This is why Chechen rebel General Dudayev gleefully predicts that his uprising will bring about World War III. The purpose of this report is to put some light on the current Great Game now in action, in hopes that those who are able, can change its disastrous course.

'Great Game' case files

The following case files are subsumed within London's "Great Game," and should be reopened for investigation.

Anglo-American support of Afghan war versus Soviet Union

Soviet tanks rolled into Afghanistan and took control of Kabul on Christmas eve in 1979. Intelligence operatives located in the inner circle around the British monarchy seized the opportunity to create the Anglo-American command and support structure for the mujahideen, especially in the United States.

From Britain, two organizations sprang into being to serve as the command center for foreign support for an Afghan guerrilla and mercenary war against Moscow. The first was AfghanAid U.K., which was established in Peshawar, Pakistan, near the Afghan border. The primary sponsor and funder of this organization, which funneled millions to the Afghan mujahideen, was Viscount Cranborne, the Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Lords.

The second was Radio Kabul, founded in the early weeks of 1980 by Lord Nicholas Bethell, a former lord-in-waiting to Queen Elizabeth II. Radio Kabul was run out of Coutts and Co., the queen's private banker.

Stateside, in 1980, John Train, a Wall Street investment banker for the fortunes of such families as the Mellons, became founder and president of the Afghanistan Relief Committee (ARC), and, according to the *Washington Post*, the Committee's "financial whiz." The ARC particularly directed funds to drug lord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in Afghanistan. Personnel of ARC overlapped with Freedom House

Case file: Karl Marx

Karl Marx, the founder of the communist movement that seized hold of Russia in April 1917, was an anti-Russian asset of Lord Palmerston's "Great Game" to bust up the alliance of the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian empires, and to dismember the Ottoman Empire. Marx played his role as an anti-Russian crusader on behalf of Palmerston through the mediation of David Urquhart, who had instigated the first uprisings of the Circassian tribes against Russia during the 1830s.

After the 1848 revolution in Germany, Marx fled to Britain, where he remained until his death in 1883. He came under the tutelage of Urquhart. Marx in part earned his living writing for Urquhart's *Portfolio*.

Urquhart was a protégé of the founder of British intelligence, Jeremy Bentham, who directed British subversion of the American Revolution. In his letters, Bentham fondly referred to Urquhart as "our David."

Urquhart steered Marx into an anti-Russian crusade, which targeted Lord Palmerston himself, as a cover for Urquhart's interest in "working-class organizing" and for Palmerston's own war against Russia. Urquhart was the mentor behind Marx's own *Life of Lord Palmerston*.

Urquhart also steered the direction of Marx's *Capital*, and the notion that technological progress causes a falling rate of profit. Urquhart's own ideas on economics were premised on aristocratic nostalgia for feudalism. He wrote that "the people of England were better clothed and fed when there was no commerce and when there were no factories."

As Marx's contemporary and biographer, John Spargo, emphasized:

"Marx gladly cooperated with David Urquhart and his followers in their anti-Russian campaign, for he regarded Russia as the leading reactionary Power in the world, and never lost an opportunity of expressing his hatred of it. In David Urquhart he found a kindred soul to whom he became greatly attached. . . . The influence which David Urquhart obtained over Marx was remarkable. Marx probably never relied upon the judgment of another man as he did upon that of Urquhart."

Marx and Urquhart's extensive correspondence has never been released to the public.

See "Lord Palmerston's Multicultural Human Zoo," *EIR*, April 15, 1994.

of New York, whose chairman, Leo Cherne, was on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, with offices at the White House. ARC's vice president, Roseann Klass, was director of Freedom House's Afghanistan Information Center.

Simultaneous to organizing the Afghan Relief Committee, Train organized a media salon, involving the Anti-Defamation League, among others, to churn out black propaganda to set the stage for the railroad prosecution and jailing of Lyndon LaRouche. Train's liaison to the White House on the "Get LaRouche" effort was Walter Raymond, who coordinated Train's Afghan support efforts in government under "Project Democracy."

Train's group paved the way for the stunning success of the visit of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Lord Bethell to the United States in 1981, to drum up U.S. official financial and logistical support for the Afghan mujahideen. Thatcher and Lord Bethell met over 60 congressmen and senators, and fostered the creation of the Committee for a Free Afghanistan, the de facto U.S. wing of Radio Free Kabul. The Committee for a Free Afghanistan, under orders from Bethell, also became a publicist for Jagjit Singh Chauhhan, the Sikh secessionist, who was later implicated in the conspiracy that led to the October 1984 murder of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

In early 1982, London's entire Afghan war policy was incorporated into the United States government with National Security Directive 3, signed by President Ronald Reagan. By this directive, Vice President George Bush was placed in charge of all covert action programs globally. Throughout the 1980s, the Afghan war was the largest single program under this Bush chain of command. Through the same apparatus, Bush's Special Situation Group (SSG) and Crisis Pre-Planning Group (CPPG) ran the illegal Iran-Contra operation.

Official U.S. funding for the Afghan mujahideen was \$3 billion.

See "New Terror International Targets South Asia," *EIR*, Oct. 13, 1995; and *Derivative Assassination: Who Killed Indira Gandhi?* by the editors of *Executive Intelligence Review*, 1985.

The Golden Crescent

Despite the funding coming from the United States, Britain, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, China, and Iran for the Afghan war against the Soviet Union, the primary funding of that war came from drug production. From the early 1980s, according to statistics compiled by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), opium cultivation in Afghanistan shot up from approximately 225 tons per year in 1981, to 488 tons in 1983; 650 tons in 1986; 750 tons in 1988; and then back to levels between 5-600 tons, until 1994, when it shot up to 950 tons per year.

Opium production in Pakistan, the logistical staging ground for the Afghan war, similarly leaped from 52 tons a year in 1983, to as high as 205 tons in 1987 and 1988, although it has settled in the 155-160 ton range in the 1990s. By the late 1980s, according to DEA reports, Pakistan's annual revenue from heroin sales was \$8-10 billion, one-fourth of the country's Gross Domestic Product. Most of the opium was processed into heroin in laboratories along the border between Afghanistan and the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, where the bulk of Pakistani opium is also grown.

Throughout the late 1980s, the Golden Crescent was second only to the Golden Triangle in supplying the world's heroin market.

The return was billions of dollars funneled into the mujahideen operation. U.S. intelligence sources report that the Cali and Medellín drug cartels of Colombia channeled \$10-20 billion to the Afghan mujahideen—by far the largest "contribution."

The central bank for this enterprise was the notorious Bank of Credit and Commerce International. During the 1980s, BCCI's assets had grown from an initial capitalization in 1972 of \$2.5 million, to \$4 billion in 1980, to \$23 billion in 1991. BCCI not only functioned as the laundromat for the billions of dollars generated from the Golden Crescent; it was also the central bank for the British and U.S. arms flows to the mujahideen. When the Colombian Medellín Cartel put \$10 million into the Bush covert fund for the Afghan war, the money was conduited through a Swiss bank account under the name of Bruce Rappaport, a Mossad agent who is chairman of the NY-Intermaritime Bank of Geneva, which is interlinked with BCCI through Alfred Hartmann, vice president of the bank and manager of BCCI's Swiss banking station, Banque de Commerce et Placements.

The BCCI, in fact, served as the central bank for all of the covert operations George Bush was directing under National Security Directive 3, including Iran-Contra.


See "New Terror International Targets South Asia," *EIR*, Oct. 13, 1995; and *Dope, Inc.*, by the editors of *Executive Intelligence Review*, 1992.

Arming both sides of the Iran-Iraq war

British intelligence, with the complicity of the U.S. Carter administration, overthrew the Shah of Iran and placed Ayatollah Khomeini in power in 1979. In early 1980, British intelligence and the Carter administration encouraged Iraq to go to war with Iran. Throughout that 1980-88 war, which killed 1 million people—Iraqis and Iranians—Britain, and its allies in the United States such as Vice President George Bush, massively armed both sides.

On Nov. 9, 1992, British Trade Minister Alan Clark testi-

The Caucasus and Central Asia in 1763

**Key to Map 3:**

The Seven Years' War between the British and French empires ended in 1763, with Britain victorious. France was finished as a naval power. Britain was poised to expand its presence throughout Asia and elsewhere. In its aftermath, France abandoned India, where it had been the dominant European power a decade earlier. British-controlled Bengal became the base through which Britain took over the entire subcontinent. French domination of the Ottoman Empire began to come to

an end; British influence there was at a take-off point. China, while not yet under British control, was weak.

The vast region between Russia, China, and what became British India, was inhabited by Turkic nomads and Afghan tribes, and the three oasis khanates of Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokand. Russia was the only major, nearby land power. Further west, Russia was situated to take over the entire Caucasus region between the Black and Caspian seas. Control over these regions was later dubbed the "Great Game."

fied in court that it was official, if covert, government policy to arm both sides of the war. "The interests of the West are well served by Iran and Iraq fighting each other, the longer the better," he said. Clark had been called as a witness in a

case against Matrix Churchill, a weapons manufacturer charged with selling military equipment to Iraq beginning in 1986, in violation of a government ban. Government documents released to the court showed the firm's shipments had

been authorized by the Thatcher cabinet, including one shipment on July 27, 1990—one week before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The government was forced to drop its case.

A subsequent investigation by British Justice Minister Sir Richard Scott, released in five volumes in February 1996, confirmed that arming Iraq was Thatcher administration policy.

A U.S. federal trial of the Atlanta, Georgia branch of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL), over financial irregularities, showed the bank had conduited over \$4 billion in “off the books” loans to Iraq (including U.S. Export-Import Bank credits) for arms purchases during the war. Simultaneously, according to Italian government investigators, BNL was extending loans to Iran for arms purchases.

British and U.S. arms sales to Khomeini’s Iran began in 1979. The British royal family’s Lonrho Ltd. was the primary firm overseeing these sales, working closely with the British intelligence proprietary Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). The Iranian National Oil Company’s purchasing office in London was a primary arms conduit.

The New York City-based Iranian banker Cyrus Hashemi, later murdered in Britain, who had worked under the control of former U.S. Assistant Attorney General J. Stanley Pottinger, was also a conduit of arms to Iran.

Testimony and documents provided to the U.S. Congressional hearings in the aftermath of the 1986 “Iran-Contra affair,” demonstrated that Vice President Bush, and his aide, former CIA official Donald Gregg, oversaw the U.S. side of the supply, employing a network of private arms dealers, such as Gen. Richard Secord, who had all earlier worked for former Bush speechwriter and CIA clandestine operations hand Ted Shackley.

See *EIR Special Reports* “Project Democracy: The ‘Parallel Government’ Behind the Iran-Contra Affair” (April 1987); “American Leviathan” (April 1990); and “Treason in Washington: New Evidence on the ‘October Surprise’ ” (February 1992).

The Olof Palme and Uwe Barschel murders

In 1995, new revelations surfaced concerning the Oct. 11, 1987 suspicious death of Uwe Barschel, former governor of the German state of Schleswig-Holstein. Barschel had been found dead in his bathtub in a hotel in Geneva, and his death was at first categorized as a “suicide.” But accumulated evidence since his death shows that he was murdered.

In 1995, Barschel’s case was officially reopened by the German courts. Revealed was the fact that Barschel had been enmeshed in a high-level *joint East-West* weapons network that involved, on the one side, the East German weapons dealer and Assistant Foreign Trade Minister Alexander

Schalck-Golodkowski, and on the other the “Enterprise” directed by U.S. Vice President Bush in the Iran-Contra operations.

Schalck-Golodkowski controlled the trading company IMES, which had regular dealings with the Iran-Contra nexus, including Oliver North, Gen. Richard Secord, and former CIA agent Thomas Clines. The IMES operative, Arthur Wenzel, who negotiated directly with Oliver North, supposedly hanged himself in prison in 1991.

IMES had come under scrutiny when incriminating documents were seized in a Sept. 15, 1985 raid at the offices of the Swedish businessman Karl-Eric Schmitz in Malmö, Sweden, across the Baltic from Rostock, where IMES’s port facility was. The Malmö raid had been conducted as part of a crack-down by Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme on illegal arms trafficking from Sweden into Iran.

Palme’s actions against this arms network were unquestionably a factor in his assassination on Feb. 28, 1986—another murder as yet unsolved.

Shortly after Palme was eliminated, a diversionary operation was launched by Department X (Ten) of the Stasi to finger then-U.S. Presidential candidate Lyndon LaRouche as the person who was allegedly behind the assassination. Not coincidentally, Department X—which was responsible for political dirty tricks as well as disinformation—is also reported to have targeted Uwe Barschel.


In 1992, Herbert Brehmer, a former officer in the Stasi department, admitted his role in the weekly magazine of the Swedish Journalists’ Association, *Journalisten*, dated Aug. 20-26, 1992, and in two subsequent half-hour radio broadcasts on Aug. 29 and Sept. 1. “At my desk, I drew up the outlines of how the ELP [European Labor Party, the Swedish co-thinker party of LaRouche] theory [that the ELP killed Palme] would be conduited into the Swedish police investigation. . . . Nothing was really true, but it sounded well-informed and credible,” Brehmer recalls.

Up through the end of 1995, the Rostock port was sealed off by a military cordon.


One ship originating from IMES in Rostock in the spring of 1986, was the Danish freighter *Pia Vesta*, which was almost nabbed by the Peruvian coastal guard as it was carrying tons of Soviet trucks, AK-47 rifles, and anti-tank rockets. Investigation showed that the arms aboard the *Pia Vesta* had actually been destined for the Contra rebels in Nicaragua, and that the shipment had been financed and arranged in a three-way deal among the Syrian arms dealer Al-Kassar, Oliver North of Contragate fame, and the Libyan bank ARES in Madrid.

Earlier, in December 1985, the firm Bofors/Nobel Kemi, whose name turns up repeatedly in the Irangate affair, is known to have shipped arms and explosives from IMES in Rostock into Iran. In 1984, Swedish customs had started cracking down on smuggling from Sweden—leading it to probe the activities of Bofors/Nobel Kemi. Large amounts of contraband from the Bofors company were confiscated. In

MAP 4
The Caucasus in 1763



MAP 6
The Caucasus in 1864



MAP 5
The Caucasus in 1830



Key to Maps 4-6:

Russia expanded into the Caucasus in the 16th century, but did not complete its subjugation of the region until the mid-19th century. This expansion was not a simple north-south movement, due to the difficulty of subduing the backward mountain tribes. Most of the region was then squabbling emirates dominated or part of the rival Ottoman and Persian empires, with Georgia having some degree of semi-independence. By 1763, Russia had taken over much of the northern flanks of the Caucasian mountain range, and the strategic Dar-yal Gorge, the passageway into Georgia and the entire Transcaucasus. Russia took over most of Georgia in 1783, annexing it in 1805-10. It crushed a mountain tribe revolt in the 1780s in the Caucasus.

Russia took control of the northeastern Black Sea coast after the 1787-91 Russian-Ottoman war, most of the Caspian Sea coast by 1796, formally annexing it in 1805. It dominated the Black Sea coast by the end of the Napoleonic wars, and following the 1828-29 Russian-Ottoman war, forced the Ottomans to cede all their Caucasian lands. Russia took formal possession of the entire region by 1830.

But two enclaves remained outside of Russian control: a Circassian tribal enclave on the Black Sea coast, and an eastern mountainous enclave inhabited by Dagestanis, Chechens, and Ingush. It was only in 1864, after 30 years of brutal guerrilla warfare, that Russia finally subdued these regions.

MAP 7

Central Asia in 1855



MAP 8

Central Asia in 1885



Key to Maps 7-8

Russia gained control over the northern region of what became Kazakhstan by 1855. The area was then inhabited by Kazakh and Kyrgyz nomads. It completed the conquest of what became Russian Central Asia in 1885.

As a result, the Russian Empire came into direct contact and conflict with the khanates of Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokand, for the first time. The khanates were based on a string of oasis cities on the Silk Route to China, in present day Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Because much of the area was desert wasteland, it

was necessary for Russia to establish forward-bases, before attempting to conquer the three states. Tashkent, the capital of Kokand, was finally seized in 1865. Russia conquered Bukhara in 1868, and Khiva in 1873. It did not completely conquer all of the region, however, until 1885.

Russia's advance led to negotiations with British India on turning Afghanistan into a buffer state between the two empires. An 1884 agreement between Russia and Britain secured a Russian-Afghan border, which has remained essentially the same since.

June 1985, customs officials confiscated 50 tons of explosives originating from Bofors, leading to the raid on Karl-Erik Schmitz's office in Malmö, in September the same year.

In January 1995, Lyndon LaRouche posed the following question, in a statement on the Barschel and Palme cases: "What are indisputably the common features of the death, and earlier murder attempt against former Schleswig-Holstein Minister-President Uwe Barschel, and the murder of Sweden's Prime Minister Olof Palme, the preceding year? Two facts are outstanding: 1) Both had become a threat to the vital political and related personal interests of the international

weapons and drug-trafficking associated with (then) U.S. Vice President George Bush's 'Special Situation Group'; 2) both were targets of the notorious Abteilung X of the D.D.R.'s Innenministerium. I was also targetted by those same agencies during that same period.

"The arms and drug traffic was vast, and the trail of dead bodies ominously large. Palme and Barschel were two among the most prominent figures who died under those circumstances. This was especially so following the 1985 police search of the premises of a Malmö, Sweden arms-trafficking agent, Karl-Erik Schmitz. In that context, Olof Palme pre-

The Caucasus and Central Asia in 1923



Key to Map 9

The end of World War I resulted in a dramatic expansion of the British Empire, through its takeover of almost all of the Mideast, serving as a flank to British India, from which Britain controlled

the entire subcontinent and also Burma. The British-sponsored Russian revolution and civil war savagely reduced Russian military power. The Ottoman Empire was also finished, but the unexpected creation of the Turkish Republic by Mustapha Kemal Atatürk upset some of Britain's plans.

sented himself as a major threat to the continuation of the Sweden side of the international weapons-trafficking operations, threatening also to blow the cover from Bush's and North's secret dealings with D.D.R. Colonel Schalck-Goldkowsky, and others. Palme died, with the diversionary cover-story provided by D.D.R. Abteilung X.

"Then, Barschel became a threat to the same concert of weapons-trafficking interests. An attempt to discredit him is followed by an attempt to kill him in an air crash, followed by his death in the Beau Rivage."

See *EIR Special Report*, "American Leviathan" (April 1990).

The Caucasus chessboard



Key to Map 10

The Caucasus area under Soviet rule had been divided into several ethnically delineated autonomous republics and regions within the Russian Federation, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. The borders of these autonomous republics and regions were often arbitrarily drawn.

Given the history of intense ethnic rivalry, and increasing poverty, it wasn't difficult to provoke wars.

Russia

Dagestan: 50,000 square kilometers; 1.8 million inhabitants. The republic is composed of a dozen tribes of Turkic and indigenous origin, with no one tribe predominating. The population is almost entirely organized into Sufi orders; clan structure remains especially strong. Dagestan is currently the main highway for mercenaries and supplies to Chechnya, via Azerbaijan. The Lezgi people, who live on both sides of the Azeri-

Dagestan border, have increasingly been organized by British intelligence into a Lezgi independence movement, making efforts to secure the border more difficult.

Chechnya: The Chechen-Ingush republic was 19,000 square kilometers in 1989, before the republic split in 1991. The Chechens were deported to Central Asia by Stalin in 1943, for alleged collaboration with the German Army, and only returned in the 1950s. The republic's population as of 1989 was 1.25 million, of whom 735,000 were Chechens and 165,000 Ingush. Since the war, some 400,000 people have fled. The Chechens are dominated by Sufi orders, and entirely organized into clans.

Ingushetia: 2,000 square kilometers. There were 215,000 Ingush in the former Chechen-Ingush republic in 1989. The Ingush formed their own autonomous republic (within Russia) in 1991, after the Chechens declared independence. During World War II, the Ingush were deported to Central Asia, while the Ossetians, who were not, were given the Prigorodny district that had been Ingush land. Competition over this district, which has never been returned, led to an Ingush-Ossete war in October 1992, and the flight of the 30,000 Ingush living there.

North Ossetia: 8,000 square kilometers; 630,000 inhabitants, of whom 60% were Ossetes, 30% Russians, and 10% Ingush, as of 1989. The Ossetes are the most russified population in the region, and are Orthodox Christians. Since the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia, virtually the entire Ossetian population of Georgia, approximately 100,000, fled to North Ossetia. South Ossetians are demanding reunification with North Ossetia.

Kabardo-Balkar: 12,500 square kilometers; 750,000 inhabitants, of whom 49% are Kabard, 32% Russian, and 11% Balkar, as of the 1989 census. The Kabards are an eastern branch of the Circassians, which includes the Adigai and Cherkess, and are cousins of the Abkhazians. The Balkars are a Turkic people, closely related to the Karachai. The Balkars were deported to Central Asia during World War II, while the Kabards were not. The Balkars have begun demanding the restoration of pre-deportation territorial districts that had been given to the Kabards. Foreign-based Circassian organizations are active among the Kabards.

Karachai-Cherkess: 14,000 square kilometers; 415,000 inhabitants, of whom 42% are Russian (mostly Cossacks), 32% Karachai, and 9% Cherkess, as of 1989. The Karachai are Turkic cousins of the neighboring Balkars; the Cherkess are Circassian cousins of the neighboring Kabards. The Karachai were deported to Central Asia in World War II and now claim full rehabilitation, including territory now held by the Cossacks. Some Karachai movements insist on a separate republic. The Cossacks, on the other hand, have reportedly advocated secession from the republic, to join the Kuban Cossacks of the neighboring Krasnodar district.

Adigai: 7,600 square kilometers; 430,000 inhabitants, of whom 68% are Russia and 22% Adigai. The Adigai are Circassian. The republic is an enclave with the Krasnodar Krai. De-

spite their tiny population within the republic, the Adigai are calling for self-determination.

Georgia

Georgia is 70,000 square kilometers in extent, and as of 1989, its population was 5.45 million. Georgians accounted for 70% of the total population. It had three autonomous areas: South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Adjara. The Georgians and Abkhazians are indigenous peoples. The Ossetians are Iranic. Virtually all of these populations are Christian.

South Ossetia: 3,900 square kilometers. In 1989, its population was 99,000 inhabitants, of whom 66% were Ossetians and 29% Georgians. Today, almost the entire Ossetian population has fled to North Ossetia, Russia. In 1989, the South Ossetian Popular Front called for reunification with North Ossetia, triggering martial law and the 1991-92 Georgian-Ossetian war.

Abkhazia: 8,600 square kilometers. In 1989, its population was 540,000, of whom 44% were Georgian, 16% Russian, and 17% Abkhazians. Since the Georgian-Abkhazian war, the Georgian population has fled. The Abkhazians are part of the Circassian group also including the Adigai, Cherkess, and Kabardians.

Adjara: 1,100 square kilometers; 140,000 population: 80% Georgian, 10% Russian, and 5% Armenia.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan is 87,000 square kilometers in extent. As of 1989, it had a population of 7 million, of whom 78% were Azeri, 8% Russian, and 8% Armenian (including the Armenian enclave of Karabakh). The Azeris are a Turkic Muslim population. Azerbaijan has huge petroleum deposits, especially in the Caspian Sea.

The British have skillfully used the various proposed, conflicting pipelines to transport this oil, as an added factor in provoking wars in the region. The entire region is desperately impoverished, and industry has collapsed. Oil extraction, transport, and refining are commonly considered to be the only means of short-term economic improvement.

Nagorno-Karabakh: 4,400 square kilometers. As of 1989, its population was 190,000, of whom 80% were Armenian and the rest Azeri. Since that time, the Azeri population has fled. Armenian agitation for the inclusion of Karabakh into Armenia in 1988 triggered ongoing Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict, resulting in each minority fleeing the other's state (with the exception of Karabakh). Armenian forces now occupy one-sixth of Azeri territory, including virtually all of Karabakh.

Armenia

Armenia is 30,000 square kilometers, with a population in 1989 of 3.3 million, of whom 90% were Armenian and 5% Azeri. The Armenians are Christian, mostly Armenian Orthodox, and indigenous to the region.

The Central Asian cauldron



Key to Map 11

Kazakhstan: 2,720,000 square kilometers; 16.5 million population as of 1989, of whom 40% were Kazakhs and 38% Russians, along with 950,000 Germans and 900,000 Ukrainians. The Russian population, which until recently was the largest ethnic group, primarily resides in the north, bordering Russia. An ethnic-based formal division of the country remains a possibility.

The Kazakhs were nomadic until the Soviet sedentization programs in the 1930s, and remain predominantly rural. The population is divided into three rival hordes, which further subdivided into tribes and clans. The population only became Islamic in the eighteenth century; Sufi orders predominate.

The country shares a long border with Xinjiang province, China, the home of some 8 million Uighur Turks. The province had been almost entirely Turkic until the 1949 Maoist revolution; subsequent Han colonization has made the Uighurs a minority. Over a half-million Uighurs now live in exile in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Kazakhstan has huge, untapped, oil and natural gas deposits, notably the Tengiz field near the Caspian Sea. Conflict over the exploitation of these deposits, and over alternative pipeline routes, is one of the primary means through which British interests are fueling war in the region. As of 1990, it had 90% of the Soviet Union's proven reserves of chrome, and 50% of its lead, tungsten, copper, and zinc. It produced 80% of the Soviet Union's phosphate, and 15% of its gold.

Kyrgyzstan: 200,000 square kilometers; 4.26 million population, of which 52% are Kyrgyz and 22% Russian, and there are 550,000 Uzbeks.

Only 7% of Kyrgyzstan is arable. Its population, until Soviet sedentization programs in the 1930s, was nomadic. The Kyrgyz remain rural; its cities are dominated by Russians and Uzbeks. The population is divided into two great tribal federations. The population only became Islamic in the eighteenth century, and is religiously dominated by the Sufi orders.

Kyrgyzstan is the primary base of efforts to raise revolt in neighboring Xinjiang, China. However, the greatest threat to the State, appears to be the opium and heroin trade, largely grown and processed in Afghanistan, but increasingly grown and processed in Kyrgyzstan. The Osh region bordering Uzbekistan is the center of the trade.

Kyrgyzstan's economy is primarily agricultural. It also has significant uranium deposits.

Tajikistan: 140,000 square kilometers; 5.1 million population as of 1989 census, of whom 62% were Tajiks and 24% Uzbeks, and there were 388,000 Russians.

The Tajiks are ethnically Iranian, and speak Farsi, the language of Iran. They are the only non-Turkic population in the region. But, like the Turkic population of the region, and unlike the Iranians, they are Sunni rather than Shiite. Unlike their nomadic neighbors, the Tajiks and Uzbeks have been rela-

tively highly urbanized. Historically, they were the merchants and other urban dwellers who ran the various oases on the Silk Route to China.

Nonetheless, Tajikistan was the poorest republic in the former Soviet Union, with an economy based on cotton production. Since independence, it has plunged into a clan-based civil war. Competition over drug trade routes from neighboring Afghanistan, and competition over massively increasing opium cultivation in Tajikistan itself, have fueled the civil war.

Tajikistan has been much affected by the arbitrary way it has been ethnically divided. The 1884 Anglo-Russian treaty, placed a large number of Tajiks in neighboring northern Afghanistan, which remains ethnically Tajik.

During the 1920s, the Soviets arbitrarily divided up the Central Asian region into five republics, creating new problems. The region had been administered as one entity under the czars. One major effect of the division was to pit Tajiks and Uzbeks against each other. Under the new division, only 65% of all Tajiks were included within Tajikistan. The Tajiks' main urban centers, and the center of their culture, Samarkand and Bukhara, were lost to Uzbekistan, as were the remaining 35% of the Tajik people. Bukhara is also the headquarters of the Naqshbandi Sufi order, which plays a dominant role in the Caucasus today.

Turkmenistan: 490,000 square kilometers; 3.525 million population, of which 72% are Turkmen and 9% Russian, and there are 320,000 Uzbeks. The Turkmen population is the most undeveloped of all the former Soviet Central Asian republics, and was, until Soviet sedentization programs, entirely nomadic. The Turkmen population is divided into 31 tribes.

The country is the site of huge untapped natural gas deposits now targeted for exploitation by competing foreign interests.

Uzbekistan: 450,000 square kilometers; 20 million population as of 1989, of which 71% are Uzbeks, 8% Russian, and 5% Tajik, and there are 800,000 Kazakhs.

The arbitrary Soviet border division of the region in the 1920s left many Uzbeks outside its borders, and over a quarter of the Tajik population within its borders. There are some 1.25 million Uzbeks in Tajikistan today, constituting 25% of Tajikistan's population. There are also over 300,000 Uzbeks in Turkmenistan, (9% of the population), and a half-million Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan, (13% of the population). Moreover, there are at least 2 million Uzbeks in neighboring Afghanistan, who are under the effective rule of the ethnic Uzbek-Afghan warlord Gen. Rashid Dostum. Uzbekistan is the militarily strongest State in the region. It has also played a major role in the Tajik civil war, and has allowed Tajik rebel leaders to reside there.

A Greater Uzbek movement has surfaced in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, an ethnic Uzbek city on the border with Uzbekistan, that is a regional center of the opium trade.

Uzbekistan's economy has been dependent on cotton production, which has comprised 40% of its total agricultural production. It has large reserves of petroleum and natural gas.

David Urquhart's holy war


by Joseph Brewda and Linda de Hoyos

In 1785, a Chechen leader, Naqshbandi Sufi Sheikh Mansur, raised the Chechen, Ingush, Ossetes, Kabard, Circassian, and Dagestani tribes in revolt against the steady advance of the Russian Empire into the Caucasus Mountains. Before 1774, the Caucasus and Transcaucasus region, now embracing Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, had been loosely ruled by the Persian and Ottoman empires. After Russia's victory over the Ottoman Empire in the war of 1768-74, the Russian military moved in on the Caucasus. Sheikh Mansur raised the flag of the "Mountain Peoples" against the czar. Although Mansur's 20,000-man force was crushed by the Russian onslaught in 1791, Sheikh Mansur became the hero of the Mountain Peoples, his revolt the inspiration for the uprisings in the Caucasus today.

Strangely, Sheikh Mansur was not a Chechen. He had been born Giovanni Battista Boetti, and had been a Dominican monk before his conversion to Islam. Although Boetti's direct ties to Venice and London are not known, his rebellion served their geopolitical aims.

Years later, another hero of the Mountain Peoples emerged. In 1837, James Bell, an agent of the British secret services who was touring the Caucasus, wrote in his memoirs that "a Circassian prince pointed out [to me] the sacred spot (as they justly esteem it) where Daud Bey had held (just three years ago) his meeting with the chieftains of this neighborhood, and first inspired them with the idea of combining themselves with the other inhabitants of the mountain provinces as a nation, under one government and standard." Daud Bey had penned the declaration of independence of Circassia and designed its flag.

Daud Bey was not a native of the Caucasus either. His name was David Urquhart, and he had been sent into the region on a special mission in 1834 by British intelligence. Urquhart had been a protégé of Jeremy Bentham, the founder and head of the newly organized British secret services in the aftermath of the American Revolution. At the point that he was posted to the Ottoman Empire in 1833, Urquhart reported directly to Sir Herbert Taylor, private secretary to King William IV, as well as to Foreign Minister Lord Palmerston.



David Urquhart, Palmerston's Peripatetic.

The occasion of Urquhart's first trip to Turkey was the 1833 Russo-Turkish treaty, through which Russia had virtually won control of the strategic Dardenelles. As Urquhart wrote in a memorandum, his mission was: "by obtaining the information necessary, to suggest measures of internal organization if the British government takes Turkey under its protection, or for meeting . . . the disorganizing influence of Russia in the contrary sense."

Urquhart's mentor in instigating revolt in the Caucasus was Prince Adam Czartoryski, an ethnic Pole who had been a Russian foreign minister during the Napoleonic wars, and who later helped lead the failed 1830 Polish rebellion against Russia.

After that venture, Prince Czartoryski fled to Britain, where he was inducted into the British Foreign Ministry, with the mission of organizing insurrections against the Russian Empire, becoming a patron of the Caucasus tribes and of Urquhart.

Full British support

During July and August 1834, Urquhart, posing as a businessman, toured the eastern shores of the Russian-con-

trolled Black Sea. Landing near the Anapa fortress, he met some 15 Circassian beys and 200 village chiefs, offering them salt, gunpowder, lead, and, eventually, full British support for revolt against Russia.

Urquhart's mission was made all the easier by Russia's murderous oppression of the Caucasus people, zealously carried out by First Viceroy Mikhail Vorontsov. As Prince Kochubey explained to an American visitor at the time: "The Circassians are like your American Indians—as untamable and uncivilized. . . . And owing to their natural energy or character, extermination only would keep them quiet."

"Daud Bey" was good to his word, as supplies and aid flowed into the Caucasus.

In 1834, Urquhart published a pamphlet, *England, Russia and Turkey*, to drum up support for his developing rebellion. He argued that it was necessary for Britain and France to check Russia's advance in the Caucasus in order to secure Turkey. In 1835, Urquhart formed *Portfolio*, a publication dedicated to the "Eastern Question." His first issue published Russian secret dispatches allegedly confirming Russia's ambitions. A later issue featured his Circassian declaration of independence.

In 1836, Urquhart returned to Istanbul as secretary at the British embassy. Toward the end of October, he outfitted a private schooner, the *Vixen*, to trade with the Circassians, in defiance of Russian trade restrictions. In early April 1837, the Russians seized the ship; the British ambassador to Turkey called on Palmerston to send a fleet, but Palmerston decided to avert a crisis at that time.

By 1840, Circassian guerrilla actions against Russian forces finally succeeded in sparking a general insurrection of all the Mountain Peoples—the Chechens, Ingush, Dagestanis, and Kabardians. The insurrection was led by Sheikh Shamil of Dagestan, who, like the former Dominican monk Sheikh Mansur, was a leader of the Naqshbandi Sufi order. Shamil created an Imamate which ruled the region with an iron fist.

During the 1853-56 Crimean War between Russia and Britain, Britain considered invading the Caucasian Black Sea coast with the help of the Circassians, but scotched the option. At the 1856 Paris peace conference, London failed in its bid to create a Circassian buffer state between Russia and Turkey.

Even after the Crimean War, London continued to aid the Caucasus rebellion. Circassian chiefs traveled to Istanbul to meet the British ambassador, Sir Henry Bulwer, to plan operations. But Russian response to the rebellion became increasingly brutal. By the time the revolt was finally crushed in 1864, more than 1 million Caucasians had either been killed, or deported to the Ottoman Empire.

"Daud Bey" had left the mountains long before. After the *Vixen* incident, Urquhart officially left British government service, insinuating himself as an adviser to the sultan of the Ottoman Empire.

General Thomson's little war

by Joseph Brewda and Linda de Hoyos

The next occasion for British interference in the Caucasus was World War I. This time the intervention was not disguised. In the aftermath of the March 1917 Menshevik revolution in Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia declared themselves independent from Russian rule. The Chechens, Dagestanis, and other mountain tribes also declared independence from Russia, and formed a Mountaineers Republic.

But independence was short-lived. In November 1918, a 23,000-man British expeditionary force led by Gen. William Thomson invaded the Caucasus region via Persia. Thomson's force occupied the Batumi, Georgia-Baku, Azerbaijan railway and other strategic points of what had been Russia, establishing military governorships in Batumi, Baku, and other areas in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Direct military occupation continued until their recapture by Russia in 1920.

In 1919, a British Foreign Office memorandum stressed the necessity for Britain to design a flexible policy: "If Russia recovers rapidly, they [Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the mountain tribes] might conceivably rejoin her in some federal relation; if the anarchy in Russia lasts many years, their present separation from her will probably be permanent. Our policy toward the Caucasus should be framed to meet either eventuality."

In reality, this meant pursuing different options simultaneously, all of them mutually exclusive (see **Map 12**), under Lord Palmerston's dictum "no permanent allies, only permanent interests."

For instance, in 1919, General Denikin's White Russian Army, heavily backed by the British, invaded the Mountaineers Republic in Dagestan, whose primary patron was Lord Curzon.


And, London fostered a constant state of conflict between its dependents Armenia and Azerbaijan, the center of which was the tug of war over the status of Karabakh.

The Karabakh region had been an ancient Armenian center, but under the Mongols had been populated by the Azeris. After Russia seized the region in the early nineteenth century, Karabakh was repopulated by Armenians, becoming an Armenian enclave in the Azeri-populated czarist district of Baku.

Jurisdiction over the enclave had become a heated emotional issue for both Azeris and Armenians. General Thomson deliberately intensified the problem.

While Thomson dished out military aid to Armenia and

British play 'Greater This' versus 'Greater That'



Key to Map 12

In the aftermath of World War I, the British simultaneously fostered several irreconcilable territorial schemes—all involving different groups of people, or conflicting lines of organization for the same people—in the Mideast, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. British sponsorship of these geopolitical entities laid the basis for conflicts for years to come, up through today.

A: "Greater Armenia." This impossible scheme was floated by Britain at the Versailles Peace Conference. In much of the area, either Armenians had ceased living there centuries before, or the Armenian population had been lost in the 1915 slaughter of Armenians by the Young Turk regime in Istanbul, itself dominated by British intelligence (see "Lord Palmerston's Multicultural Human Zoo," *EIR*, April 15, 1994). The idea of a Greater Armenia had first been concocted in the 1890s by former British Prime Minister William Gladstone and Foreign Minister Lord Salisbury, as a way to dismantle the Ottoman Empire. During World War I, the primary British case officers for the project were Sir Mark Sykes, who supervised plans to divide the Ottoman Empire with France and Russia, and Lord Noel Buxton, from the powerful Quaker family that controls Barclays Bank.

The geopolitical purpose of Greater Armenia was to drive

a wedge between Turkic Central Asia and Turkey, and to lay the seeds for continuing Armenian-Turkish conflict, and continuing Armenian-Kurdish conflict. As Sykes noted at the time, "The Armenian question is the real answer to Pan-Turanisms, just as free Arabia is the answer to Turkish pan-Islamism."

B: "Greater Kurdistan." London had also promoted the creation of this entity at Versailles. Kurds had never occupied most of these lands. Kurdish nationalism had also come into being through British sponsorship in the 1890s. During World War I, the British case-officer for Greater Kurdistan was Lord Cornwallis (a descendant of the general who surrendered to George Washington at Yorktown).

The geopolitical purpose of Greater Kurdistan was also to drive a wedge between Turkic Central Asia and Turkey, and to sow the seeds for both continuing Kurdish-Turkish conflict, and Kurdish-Armenian conflict.

C: The Muslim buffer state. The project to create a vast Muslim buffer state between Russia and British India and the British Mideast, had been first championed by Lord Lytton, the Viceroy of India, in the 1870s, and his uncle, Sir Henry Bulwer, ambassador to the Ottoman Empire. The ideological basis for this buffer state was the Pan-Islamic movement. In the immediate aftermath of World War I, the idea was advocated by Col.

Georgia, but *not* Azerbaijan, he decreed that Karabakh remain under Azeri administration, and appointed an Azeri governor general for Karabakh, who was notorious for his massacring of Armenians. Thomson gave the nod to Azeri repression of Karabakh Armenians.

Thomson armed the Armenians, albeit inadequately. In August 1919, the outgunned Armenians of Karabakh finally accepted Azeri jurisdiction.

The same month, the British began their withdrawal from the Transcaucasus, deliberately paving the way for chaos. "I am fully aware that the withdrawal of the British troops would probably lead to anarchy," wrote General Milne, commander in chief of the Army of the Black Sea, "but I cannot see that the world would lose much if the whole of the inhabitants of the country cut each others' throats."

Stalin in charge

The return of Russian rule to the region, in 1920-21, however, did not bring peace. Joseph V. Stalin was Soviet Commissioner for Nationalities Affairs (an organization he headed from its inception in 1917 through its dissolution in 1924). A son of neighboring Georgia, Stalin had served the Bolshevik underground in Baku, Azerbaijan, where, in the words of one Azeri historian, "he witnessed the outbreaks of violence between Azeri Turks and Armenians as well as the methods used by czarist agents and police to ensure rivalry which could deflect deep-seated anti-Russian resentment." Stalin employed the same methods.

Under his direction, the Azerbaijan presidium formed a

Claude Stokes, the British High Commissioner in Transcaucasia, with the quiet support of Lord Curzon, then British foreign minister. This state, he asserted, "would lean upon Great Britain and provide a buffer between Russia and the British Asiatic possessions."

The additional geopolitical purpose of this plan was to instigate Russian-Turkish and Turkic conflict.

D: The Mountaineer Republic. The idea of creating a Caucasian mountain state separating Russia from the Transcaucasus and Mideast, was first advanced by David Urquhart, an agent of British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, in the 1830s. After World War I, it was revived as policy by Lord Curzon.

The geopolitical purpose of this republic was to foment Russian-Turkish conflict.

E: The Russian Empire. In 1919, Britain proposed two conflicting schemes to preserve the territory of the collapsed Russian Empire. One was the creation of a new Bolshevik form of the old empire, based on the doctrine of Karl Marx, a political dependent of David Urquhart. The second was the restoration of monarchist or anti-Bolshevik "White" forces led by General Denikin, among others. The case of British intelligence agent Alexander Helphand Parvus, who patronized both sides, exemplifies British operations in this theater.

Central Commission on Nagorno-Karabakh affairs, which decreed that an autonomous Armenian enclave, only a dozen miles from Armenia itself, be created within Azerbaijan. The decision satisfied none of the parties.

Thus, Stalin continued the same geopolitical machinations in the region, played by the czar and British General Thomson, before him. But as the events of the 1990s have shown, once a region is locked into a geopolitical chessboard, anyone can play.

Nagorno-Karabakh: 'apple of discord'

by Joseph Brewda and Linda de Hoyos

The reopening of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict at first appears to have had its source in Moscow. In 1987, the Soviet semi-official *Literaturnaya Gazeta* opened an environmentalist scare campaign against the nuclear reactor near Yerevan, the Armenian capital, and against the city's synthetic rubber plant. By September 1987, the author, Zoray Balayan, a reputed member of the inner circle around then-Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachov, organized a demonstration at the rubber plant. The rally was joined by Armenian nationalist leader Paruyr Hairikian.

The dual scare was only the springboard for bigger aims. By the end of October, Balayan's "green" movement was calling for the unification of Karabakh with Armenia. On Oct. 18, Soviet authorities dispersed "green" demonstrators demanding Karabakh's repatriation.

From that point onward, three Armenian leaders emerged in the international spotlight: Zoray Balayan; Abel Aganbegyan, Gorbachov's chief economic spokesman; and Sergio Mikoyan, then editor of the KGB's *América Latina*. Ironically, Mikoyan's father, Anastas Mikoyan, the KGB strongman and Stalin lieutenant, had dominated the Nagorno-Karabakh Commission that had carved out Karabakh as a separate enclave within Azerbaijan in the 1920s.

In January 1988, the three set out to organize the large Armenian diaspora in the west for Karabakh's return—Mikoyan and Balayan to the United States, and Aganbegyan to London and Paris.

Mikoyan and Balayan, accompanied by Rair Simonyan, a member of the Soviet General Staff, attended a Feb. 1-5 conference sponsored by the Center for Soviet-American Dialogue in Raddison, Maryland. They then toured the United States, calling upon the Armenian-American community to mobilize for immediate unification. Their rhetoric was so inflammatory, Armenian sources emphasize, that many of their



Levon Ter-Petrossian, the President of Armenia (left) and Heidar Aliyev, the President of Azerbaijan (right). Both emerged from the Soviet KGB, and both countries are now being torn apart by internal warfare.



comments were censored in the often sensationalist Armenian-American press, out of fear that the push for unification was being covertly sponsored by Gorbachov as a strategic trap.

Nevertheless, within Armenia, irredentism surfaced dramatically.

On Feb. 20, the Nagorno-Kabarakh Autonomous Regional Soviet voted to "transfer the Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabakh from the Azerbaijani S.S.R. to the Armenian S.S.R., and at the same time to intercede with the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. to reach a positive resolution regarding the transfer of the region from the Azerbaijani S.S.R. to the Armenian S.S.R." The next day, 50,000 people marched in Yerevan in support of the demand. Within a week, 1 million Armenians were marching in the streets.

According to Armenian and other regional sources, various Armenian nationalists, such as Paruyr Hairikian, were convinced that they had the backing of both Soviet and western government agencies in this effort. Events showed otherwise.

Reaction from Azerbaijan was no less intense. On Feb. 27, Azeri squads began a two-day anti-Armenian pogrom in Sumgait, an Armenian-Azeri town 30 miles from Baku, the Azeri capital. Azeri sources believe that the riot, which killed several dozen people, could not have occurred without Soviet

complicity. Soviet troops later intervened and imposed martial law.

On March 23, the Soviet presidium issued its ruling on Karabakh: It recognized that Armenian national rights had been infringed, but a change in status was impossible. Both sides were simultaneously encouraged and provoked.

On June 15, the Armenian Supreme Soviet reported it would accept the Karabakh Soviet's call for unification. On July 12, the Karabakh Soviet announced that it had "seceded" from Azerbaijan, and was now to be known as the Artsakh autonomous region of Armenia.

On Sept. 18, 1988, clashes between Armenians and Azeris began in Stepanakert, the Karabakh capital.

The war was on. By November, refugees were fleeing both States under threat of murderous pogroms: 180,000 Armenians in Azerbaijan, out of a total population of 400,000, ran to Armenia: 150,000 of the 160,000 Azeris in Armenia took refuge in Azerbaijan.

The war proceeded indecisively until February 1992, when the Armenians began gaining victories, beginning with the capture of Khojaly, and then Shusha and the Lachin Corridor in March. In 1993, the Armenians struck deep into Azeri territory, taking Kelbajar (March), Agdam (July), Jebrail and Fizuli (August). In September, they took Kubatly, giving them domination over the 160-kilometer Azeri-Iranian bor-

der. A cease-fire was declared in May 1994, which is still holding. Approximately one-sixth of Azerbaijan's total land is now under Armenian occupation. Some 1 million Azeris have been driven from their homes. Armenia remains under a murderous blockade, imposed by Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Double, double cross

Although it is true that both Azeris and Armenians have waged the war over Nagorno-Karabakh with passion and fury, it is doubtful that any such war would occur at all, if it were not for the parallel and mutually abetting policies of both British and Russian intelligence. Armenia and Azerbaijan today stand, each as mirror images of the other, but it is the string-pullers in London and Moscow who are holding the mirrors, first tilting one way, then the other.

Today, each country is ruled by someone who was once a prominent member of the Soviet KGB—Levon Ter-Petrosian in Armenia, and Heidar Aliyev in Azerbaijan. In the fall of 1990, Ter-Petrosian of the Karabakh Committee won the Presidency in the general election. Raised in Syria with close political ties to Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, Ter-Petrosian came to the Armenian Presidency from a career in the Mideast division of Soviet KGB.

In Azerbaijan, Aliyev came to the fore in September 1992, when he created the New Azerbaijan Party. Before 1990, Aliyev had been the Soviet deputy prime minister, a post he came to as a high official of the KGB, where he specialized in the Mideast division. Aliyev came to power in June 1993, after a series of Azeri military defeats. He promptly brought Azerbaijan into the Community of Independent States, distanced Azerbaijan from Turkey, and brought a halt to any discussion of uniting with Azeris on the other side of the Iranian border.

Aliyev and Ter-Petrosian have similar domestic opponents. In Armenia, once in power, Ter-Petrosian has squared off against the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, or Dashnag, which had led the campaign for unification with Karabakh. Dashnag is based in Athens, Greece, and in the United States, but was created as far back as 1890, under the sponsorship of Britain's William Gladstone and Prime Minister Lord Salisbury. Today, it enjoys the patronage of the Christian Solidarity International (CSI) of Baroness Caroline Cox, deputy speaker of the British House of Lords. In 1992, Ter-Petrosian expelled Dashnag chief Grair Marukhian from Armenia, and in December 1994, he banned the party altogether. Dashnag's lobbying in the United States has been crucial to the Armenian cause. In 1993, the U.S. Congress allocated \$193 million to Armenia, second only in amount to that given to Russia among the former Soviet States.

In Azerbaijan, Aliyev's opponent is the Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF) of Abulfaz Elcibey, a Sufi historian with close ties to Turkey, specifically to the Pan-Turkic Party of Gen. Alparslan Turkes.

The APF grew out of the Varlyg (Reality) organization, which sprang into action in Baku against Armenia in May 1988. In early 1989, Varlyg formed the APF with a coalition of other nationalist groups. After the December 1989 ruling of the Armenian Supreme Soviet to formally incorporate Karabakh, armed groups of the APF began destroying Soviet installations on the border with Iran, in protest against Soviet inaction. In Baku and other cities, the APF led pogroms against Armenians. The wave of violence was finally halted in January 1990, when Moscow declared a state of emergency and a 20,000-man force invaded Azerbaijan. The political result of this action, however, sent the APF's popularity soaring.

In the wake of Armenian military victories against Azeri forces, the APF stormed the palace of Azeri President Mutalibov in May 1992, forcing him to flee to Moscow. In June 1992, Elcibey was elected President. Soon, followers of Pan-Turkic Party leader Gen. Alparslan Turkes were traveling to Azerbaijan to train the army. Elcibey demanded unity with Iranian Azerbaijan. Elcibey, however, could not stem the tide of Azeri defeats, and, on this basis, Aliyev took the reins of power in 1993.

Thus, each country is in a near-state of internal war, between what would appear to be those forces orbiting Moscow, and those orbiting London.

Arms to all sides

Complicating matters further is that both Russia and London, and allied forces, have provided aid and military assistance to both countries simultaneously, deliberately prolonging the hostilities between the two interlocking countries.

From 1988 to 1992, Moscow aided and abetted both sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, through massive arms deliveries, up to and including armor, artillery, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft, and the "loaning" of Russian "volunteer" military specialists to both sides. This process occurred through the withdrawal of Russian forces, leaving behind stocks of arms, ammunition, and equipment.

Russian aid to Armenia: In the case of the 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment, in its withdrawal from Karabakh in February-March 1992, its Armenian components joined the Karabakh "Self-Defense Forces." This enabled the Karabakh Armenians to launch the offensives of April-May 1992 that won the crucial Lachin Corridor, establishing an overland road link between the Armenian "mainland" and Karabakh. In May 1992, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachov traveled to Armenia to discuss a security pact. In 1993, Armenia took a second Armenia-Karabakh Corridor through Kelbadjar, and captured Azerbaijani territory to the north, east, and south of Karabakh.

Russian aid to Azerbaijan: The overthrow of Abulfaz Elcibey in Azerbaijan in 1993 was made logistically possible

through the mass transfer of arms, equipment, vehicles, and fuel by units of the Russian Army withdrawing from Azerbaijan. The central role in this process was played by the Russian 104th Airborne Division, which was withdrawn from Azerbaijan in February to May 1993. By arrangement, the division turned over large stocks, not to the regular units of the Azerbaijan Army, but to the private "army" of "Colonel" Suret Huseinov (an enlisted veteran of Soviet Airborne Forces).

Huseinov, during Aliyev's earlier rule in Azerbaijan within the Soviet Union, had already become a multimillionaire through illegal private sales of textiles and other goods from State enterprises, well on the way to becoming the type of "private mafioso" now dominating Russia. With his millions, and his solid KGB and military connections, he was able to raise the numerically strongest private army in Azerbaijan. Through the largesse of the 104th Airborne Division, overnight, his units became the best-armed and -equipped in Azerbaijan.

In June 1993, Huseinov launched a revolt of Azeri troops, which seized the nation's second largest city, Ganja. The rebels then began a "March on Baku," which forced a terrified President Elcibey to flee. Within days, Aliyev was in power.

The Iran-Contra hand

Russia's militaristic meddling is matched by London's.

British-U.S. aid to Azerbaijan: British aid to Azerbaijan in the form of arms, arms training, and mercenaries, first surfaced in January 1994, when the British Foreign Office, responding to press reports, admitted to knowledge of such activity. The commercial cover for this aid has been the British-registered, Northern Cyprus-based, Summit (Consortium) Ltd. The covert supply was directed by Lord Erskine of Rerrick, a retired career military officer with experience in Asia, who had been managing director of Lonrho Ltd. in Iran in the 1970s.

The U.S. Bush administration's involvement in arming and training the Azeris first surfaced in 1991. Case officer for this detail was Gen. Richard Secord of Iran-Contra fame, and Gen. Heine Aderholt, Secord's former superior officer, then head of the Air Commando Association. Both had been contracted to train special commando units in four military training camps in Azerbaijan.

To provide cover for the training, the Azeri government hired MegaOil USA of Marietta, Georgia, and Ponder Industries, of Alice, Texas, to provide technical services for Azerbaijan's oil industry. MegaOil Chairman Gary Best had a long-standing relationship with Afghan mujahideen warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

According to the initial terms of the MegaOil deal, Secord and Aderholt were to train 5,000 Azeri troops for commando missions against Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh. Secord made several trips to Azerbaijan to that end in the early 1990s.

When the APF's Elcibey came to power in Azerbaijan in May 1992, western assistance to Azerbaijan increased. Turkish officers began training the Azeri officer corps, both in Azerbaijan and Turkey. Israel also provided military training, including at its facilities in Israel.

But Elcibey's overthrow by the KGB's Aliyev in June 1993 did not end British, American, and Israeli military boosting of Azerbaijan. By 1994, an estimated 1,000 to 3,500 former Afghan mujahideen, who had been trained in Pakistan by the British and U.S. mujahideen organizers, were brought into Azerbaijan, to fight against Armenia.

British-U.S. aid to Armenia: The key figure promoting the Armenian Karabakh cause internationally has been Deputy Speaker of the British House of Lords Baroness Caroline Cox, a longtime intimate of former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. A career British intelligence official who had earlier handled relations with the Polish Solidarity organization, Cox emerged as the principal international supporter of Armenian efforts to seize Karabakh in 1990. Since then, she has led over a dozen fact-finding trips there, and has repeatedly testified before numerous European parliaments, as well as the U.S. Congress.

Baroness Cox paints the conflict in apocalyptic terms. "Azerbaijan has an explicit policy of ethnic cleansing of the Armenians in Karabakh," she told the National Prayer Breakfast in Washington in February 1995. "The Armenians have been fighting for the survival of their lives, and their—and our—Christian heritage." "Islamic extremism" and "hatred of Christianity," she said, are the cause of the war.

Baroness Cox's crusade for Armenia is run under the aegis of her Christian Solidarity International, a group formed by the Keston Institute of Oxford, England. Yet, CSI is hardly consistent. One of its founders, Lord Avebury, the head of the Human Rights Committee of the Parliament, is the major foreign propagandist for the Muslim Chechens who have long been allied with the Azeris. Like Colonel Stokes earlier in this century, Avebury wants to become the founding father of a Northern Caucasian Muslim confederation, and has traveled to Abkhazia, Chechnya, and other Caucasian areas to that end.

For its part, the Bush administration, which tended to be dominated by Thatcher, first sent aid to Armenia in the aftermath of the December 1988 earthquake. At that early point, Bush representatives gave encouraging signals to Armenian organizations determined to seize Karabakh. Among the relief agencies on the scene were Americares and the International Rescue Committee.

Americares had been one of the major sources of funds to the Afghan mujahideen. George Bush's brother, Prescott Bush, Jr., and Gen. Richard Stilwell, the former Pentagon intelligence chief in the Reagan-Bush administration, are on the group's board. The International Rescue Committee is led by Leo Cherne, who was then also deputy director of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

The Caucasus: new 'afghansi' hotbed

by Joseph Brewda and Linda de Hoyos

Since 1994, the war in Chechnya has been raging, right in the center of the Caucasus. Not only has the Chechen independence movement been at war with Russia, but civil war has erupted within Chechnya itself, an autonomous republic within Russia. As of November 1995, the war had resulted in the deaths of 2,000 Russians, and 30-35,000 Chechens.

Most of the conflict has centered around Gen. Jokhar Dudayev, the self-styled president and strongman of "independent Chechnya." General Dudayev had held the highest rank of any Chechen in the Russian military. Specifically, Dudayev had led Air Force operations during the Soviet war in Afghanistan, where he introduced the tactic of carpet bombing of Afghan villages, women and children, and mujahideen. Today, he is leading a secessionist armed force against the Russian military. He confirmed, in a March 15 interview from his Chechen hideout with the British daily the *Independent*, that "Chechen fighters, who are Islamic, have trained in Afghanistan and Bosnia" with the Afghan mujahideen, whom Dudayev was fighting less than a decade ago.

What has made this inverse relationship possible? Former U.S. President George Bush may be able to supply some clues. In 1992, Dudayev, who had become the ruler of Chechnya in September 1991, visited the United States, Germany, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, to muster support and funds for the Chechen cause. According to Saluddin Gugai, the Chechen representative in the United States who organized it, the trip was deliberately not publicized. In the United States, Dudayev was unable to meet with President George Bush, "but at least he did get to meet high-level people at the State Department. . . . George Bush and the Republicans were certainly more sympathetic to Chechen independence than Clinton."

From Washington, Dudayev flew to Houston, Texas. Bush's home base, where he had "three days of meetings with the oil companies," says Gugai. Although Dudayev was at first pleased with the offers coming from the U.S. oil multinationals, his representative noted that the promised largesse was not forthcoming.

That year, Dudayev also managed to meet British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who, according to Gugai, is "100% on our side, our most important supporter in Britain."

The same tour took Dudayev to Saudi Arabia. In a follow-up to that visit, Dudayev's major representatives in the United States met with Prince Bandar, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States and a friend of George Bush. "You know that

the Saudis gave \$10 billion to aid the struggle in Afghanistan," Gugai noted, "and they are trying to help Bosnia. They always follow the West's lead."

Parallel to the diplomatic forays, which are likely to have given the green light for the deployment of Afghan mujahideen into Chechnya, other negotiations were taking place. By the beginning of 1992, Dudayev succeeded in seizing the arsenal of the Soviet Armed Forces in Chechnya, and Russian authorities lost control over Chechen airspace. At that time, according to Russian sources, massive numbers of unauthorized flights from Chechnya began, taking drugs or other contraband to Turkey, Iran, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere.

Simultaneously, according to sources from several continents, the Chechen secessionists entered into cooperative pacts with a number of mujahideen field commanders in Afghanistan, whose military operations have for years been supplied by drug production and trafficking. The links for such cooperation lay in the KGB's close contact with the Afghan secret police (Khad), and also with the circles around Afghan warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum.

That the "Chechen mafia" is a key player in Central Asian, and especially Afghan drug-trafficking, is a recognized fact. According to Dr. Anton Surikov, a senior investigator with the Russian Feliks Research Group formed in 1991 to investigate economic crimes in Russia, the Chechen mafia is centered around the Melkhi clan and the Chechen Department of State Security, headed by a Melkhi, Sultan Geliskhanov. Among the insiders of the ring is General Dudayev's brother, Bek-Murzy.

According to some accounts, Afghan drugs are flown directly to Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, from airports in northern Afghanistan such as Akcha and Mazare Sharif. There are also reports circulating in Central Asia that by 1994, the Chechen mafia had teamed up with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The Chechens supply Hekmatyar et al. with weapons, and are reportedly seeking to acquire the Stinger missiles from Hekmatyar that had proved to be the crucial Afghan weapon against General Dudayev's assaults during the Afghan war.

Hence, the route that takes Afghan mujahideen to fight for Chechen independence, is the same route that brings raw opium and cannabis from Afghanistan to Chechnya for refining and shipment, on its way to the Mideast and western Europe.

Mere pawns in the game

The case of Dudayev is an excellent illustration of the depth of depravity and extent of criminality required to put into effect London's geopolitical designs against nations. London's propagandists even parade their encouragement of Chechen secessionism and military ventures as a defense of human rights!

Despite what must be a lucrative position, Dudayev is a mere pawn in a far bigger game. For years, analysts and pro-

filers orbiting around British intelligence have been happily predicting a Caucasian revolt that would destroy the Soviet Union. The premier warbler for this set is Prof. Alexandre Bennigsen of the Sorbonne, in Paris, where he was the protégé of the Sorbonne dean of orientology and a Sufi mystic, Louis Massignon. Bennigsen's daughter, Marie Bennigsen Broxup, has followed in his footsteps and is now editor of the British quarterly *Central Asian Survey*.

In his 1985 book *Mystics and Commissars: Sufism in the Soviet Union*, Bennigsen proclaimed that "the nearly 50-year-long Caucasian wars [of the nineteenth century] made an important contribution to the material and moral ruin of the czarist empire and hastened the downfall of the Romanov monarchy." Today, Bennigsen underscores, the Sufi brotherhood of the Caucasus remains a most potent weapon against Moscow: "In the particular case of the North Caucasus, Sufi orders have gained control not only over fundamentalist trends but also over all national resistance movements from the later eighteenth century to the present day. The Chechen-Ingush territory and Dagestan, was among the last Muslim territories to which the Sufi brotherhoods gained access, but once established there, Sufism played a prominent role. Today this territory is probably the one where organized mystic movements are the most dynamic and active in the entire Muslim world."

By the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, Bennigsen's "analysis," elaborated and publicized by his daughter, had become standard fare among the boosters of various secessionist movements in the Caucasus. In 1992, the year Dudayev was receiving such encouragement from Thatcher, the Minority Rights Group of Britain, chaired by Sir John Thomson, former British ambassador to India and the United Nations, issued a report on the North Caucasus region, taking up Bennigsen's cause. The report pointed to, although not explicitly, the ripe ground for manipulation of the people of the region: "Many of the aspirations of the peoples of the region are contradictory and several forces play one group against the other. The region is witnessing a number of internal conflicts over territories and borders, with the struggle for sovereignty, and difficult relations with the central governments at the forefront. Complex internal claims and disagreements, coupled with a growing antagonism between the region and its political centers dominate the political agenda. The absence of constructive policies and political will to implement them have led in some areas to cruel open conflicts. Any new attempt to enforce solutions and ignore claims will add to the feeling of estrangement and feed nationalist tendencies both among North Caucasian peoples and among Russians. This contributes to a general feeling of uncertainty and insecurity in a region which could become subject to major turmoil and violence. The North Caucasus is therefore a region not only at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, and of different cultural and political norms, but also at a distinct crossroads concerning its political development.

"In terms of minority issues, the North Caucasus is probably the one region in Europe with the highest potential for long-term conflict."

The Unrepresented Peoples Organization (UNPO) issued a similar analysis, written by Lord Ennals. After a "fact-finding tour" to Chechnya and nearby Abkhazia, Ennals wrote: "The Northern Caucasus region is of strategic importance to Russia. It is the gateway to the entire Caucasus, a region in which Russia wants to maintain a sphere of influence. . . . Russia has traditionally conducted a 'divide and rule' policy in the Northern Caucasus. Today, it appears that this policy is being revived in a significant way to prevent the various peoples of the region from forming a united front against Russia. A number of leaders of North Caucasus peoples—prominent among them the Abkhazians, the Chechens, and the Kabardians—formed the Confederation of North Caucasus Peoples in 1989. . . . Its objective is to unite the North Caucasus peoples. If Abkhazians, with the help of volunteers from the North Caucasus region, can show that an attack on such people cannot take place without serious resistance, this will discourage future attacks on any of the North Caucasus peoples."

The "Chechen Republic" was accepted as a full member of the UNPO as early as August 1991, and UNPO headquarters at The Hague is the "Chechen" international embassy. In October 1991, the UNPO had sent a team to monitor the "elections" in Chechnya. The UNPO team's report was printed in full in the *Central Asian Survey*.

The UNPO is enthusiastic over the Chechen cause. It has consistently demanded that Moscow negotiate with the rebels. In November 1994, it warned that "an act of genocide was being prepared against the Chechen nation." It said that "the cause of the Chechen desire for independence," undoubtedly echoing the words of "Daud Bey," "is consistent mistreatment of the Chechens, the Ingush, and other North Caucasian peoples by Russia." Echoing Bennigsen, however, the UNPO lauds "the various Sufi orders . . . which have been centers of anti-Russian (czarist) and anti-Soviet (communist) resistance."

In 1995, the UNPO sponsored the trip of General Dudayev's envoy Aslambek Khadiyev, to The Hague, where the UNPO "opened contacts with foreign governments" in Europe and the Middle East, and with the United States.

The Bennigsen-UNPO thesis was finding its way into official quarters. In January 1995, Harold Elletson, the advocate for Chechen secession in the British House of Commons, told *EIR* that the West would have to move rapidly to extend NATO eastward in response to Russian military actions against Chechen terrorists. Russia should no longer be granted soft loans, he said.

At the same time, NATO policy planners were adopting the view that continual war in the Caucasus was inevitable. A 1995 NATO study, *Contested Borders in the Caucasus*, predicted that contested territorial claims among the autonomous republics of the Caucasus could only lead to continuous

strife. "Never before, since the turbulent period of 1918-21 which followed the fall of the Russian Empire, have conflicts raged with such deadly animosity. Old ethnic wounds have reopened, leading in some cases to sustained warfare, in others to ethnic strife punctuated by intermittent clashes."

President Clinton is the implicit target of the same war-mongering. A spokesman for Pax Christi, which works closely with Elletson, insisted to *EIR* that the main difficulty in stopping Russian "genocide" against Chechnya is the Clinton administration, because it classifies the war as a "Russian internal affair." It is "strongly opposed to use any kind of effective pressure on the Russian government to comply with its international obligations [regarding Chechnya], despite the strong leverage that presented itself when the IMF [International Monetary Fund] finalized a major loan to the Russian Federation in April 1995," the spokesman said.

Dudayev's rise to power

Dudayev's rise to power does not exactly cohere with the democratic rhetoric of his foreign supporters. In November 1990, the Chechen Popular Congress, whose members largely favored autonomy within Russia, was formed, and the prestigious Dudayev was among its leaders. In June 1991, he was elected its leader. The Congress called for complete independence from Russia; those nationalists who favored less drastic steps were purged. On Sept. 1, 1991, Dudayev condemned the Chechen Supreme Soviet as illegitimate and declared himself Chechnya's ruler. His followers stormed the parliament building that day, and seized control of the Chechen Soviet later that week.

When Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy called for disarming Dudayev's militias on Oct. 9, Dudayev ordered a general mobilization of all Chechens against Russia, and his allied Vaynakh Democratic Party called for "holy war." A "general election" in Chechnya on Oct. 27 brought Dudayev 90% of the vote, and Dudayev was quickly granted emergency powers by his rubber-stamp parliament.

At the same time, Dudayev declared full Chechen independence. No State formally recognized the entity, but various countries did sign treaties with Dudayev—Turkey, Germany, Japan, the Baltic States, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.

From the beginning, Dudayev had been challenged by various Chechen clans and parties. In April 1993, he summarily shut down parliament and the constitutional court. Rebellious Chechen forces withdrew to the northwest, where they began receiving aid and supplies from Moscow. Civil war ensued. In June 1994, the Chechen opposition launched an unsuccessful bid to seize Grozny, a failure that soon led to direct Russian military intervention.

In early December 1994, Russian aircraft began bombing airfields and army camps in Chechnya. On Dec. 11, some 40,000 Russian troops entered Chechnya, but were badly defeated when they tried to take the capital in January. The Russian Air Force then began carpet-bombing Grozny, razing

the city to the ground and killing close to 25,000 civilians. The Russians finally took the ruined city and three others, as the war shifted to the mountains.

Despite a cease-fire in June 1995, and the Russian installation of a new government supplanting Dudayev as President in December, the war in Chechnya continues, characterized by bombings of Chechen villages by the Russian Air Force, in retaliation for guerrilla assaults on occupying Russian troops. The collapse of the Soviet Union, followed by the conditions set by British geopolitical war, has brought the career of General Dudayev full circle.

Georgia: the 'mini-empire'

One of the most dramatic incidents of the Chechen war was the seizing of a hospital in the southern Russian town of Budyonnovsk by Chechen guerrillas, who held the patients hostage. When their demands for Russia to end the war were denied, the guerrillas executed eight patients, prompting a Russian assault on the hospital in which 120 people were killed. The Chechen adventure had been led by Shamil Basayev, one of Dudayev's top lieutenants. According to Pakistani press reports, Basayev had been trained with Afghan mujahideen in Pakistan. Before his exploits in the Chechen war, he had also led the "Abkhaz Battalion," a Chechen unit which had been formed to fight for Abkhazian independence from Georgia.

Georgia was a constituent republic of the Soviet Union, whose territory includes three separate autonomies: Abkhazia, Adjara, and South Ossetia. All entities had been divided on ethnic lines. In practice, all three autonomies were ruled by the Georgian capital, Tbilisi. From the point of its incorporation into Georgia by Stalin in 1931, Abkhazia had been subject to cultural extirpation. The Abkhazian language was banned, and Georgians settled in the enclave; today only 17% of Abkhazia is actually Abkhazian.

The Ossetians of Georgia are descendants of cruelly oppressed serfs who worked on Georgian feudal estates. During the 1918-22 Russian civil war, the Menshevik-controlled Georgians slaughtered the Bolshevik-sponsored Ossetians. In the early years of the Soviet regime, while Georgia was agitating for independence, the South Ossetians remained loyal to Russia, and in 1925, the South Ossetians called for reunification with North Ossetia, under Russian rule.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Georgia moved swiftly to create its own sovereign State. Abkhazia and South Ossetia followed suit, demanding nationhood, independent of Georgia. Georgia claimed the right to independence from Moscow based on the doctrine of "self-determination." Abkhazia and South Ossetia advanced the same principle against Georgia.

In 1989, the Abkhazians and Chechens formed the Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus, in defiance of both Moscow and Tbilisi. The Confederation, godfathered by Dudayev, was a revival of the Mountain Republic conceived by Lord Curzon in 1918. All the North Caucasian mountain

Lord Curzon stalks the Caucasus

"Chechens Pin Hopes on Pax Britannica," was the headline of the Jan. 14 London *Sunday Telegraph* article filed by war correspondent Alan Philps, who had walked through Russian lines to interview Salman Raduyev, the son-in-law of Chechen leader Gen. Jokhar Dudayev and "chief hostage-taker."

As Philps tells it, "In the foothills of the Caucasus mountains, there is still a touching faith in the power of the British Empire. Strange as it may seem, the hostage crisis in southern Russia is being played out against a background of hopes and fears of British intervention, as if Lord Curzon still held sway over the world."

"In the minds of the Chechen government, it is a certainty that Britain will come to their aid against the Russian enemy. When they seized 2,000 hostages in the hospital in the Dagestani town of Kizlyar in the early hours of Tuesday morning, one of the bearded militants said the raid would usher in a golden era of British rule in the Caucasus. . . .

"There is a folk belief that Britain will rule for seven years, after which a golden era of peace and prosperity will begin. . . . This belief dates from 150 years ago, when the Chechens were resisting the Russian army. British news-

papers were then filled with reports of battles for obscure mountain villages, as the Russians pressed on to threaten the Ottoman Empire and perhaps India itself. At the time, society ladies in England collected blankets to help the sturdy mountain-folk fight the czar."

Despite the most fervent hopes of Chechen rebels, however, a British military expert on the Caucasus at the Sandhurst Military Academy's Center for Conflict Studies, says there will be no military help for the Chechen cause coming from Britain. This is understood by the Chechen military, he explained. In fact, while visiting Chechnya in December 1995, he said, Chechen Chief of Staff Gen. Mashedov "told me personally, that 'we are on our own, no one can help us.'"

But, Sandhurst's case officer continued: "All we British can do to help, is to make public the information about what is happening there. It was the Russians who broke off the talks. They are going down a path to increased bloodshed. The Chechens have resisted the Russians for 250-300 years. They never accepted Russian domination. They're a fiery-looking race—of course, not the bearded ones. But basically, they're excellent horsemen, good rifle shots, they're fleet of foot, they're not a warrior race, they're well-equipped with the martial arts."

"I see the Russians in for enormous trouble, as they get more and more stuck, as this thing goes on. In the longer term, what is building up, is great resentment among the Muslim peoples of the Caucasus."

tribes supported the Confederation, as did the International Circassian Association, a diaspora organization based in Britain, Turkey, Jordan, Israel, and the United States. In August 1992, the Confederation, meeting in Chechnya, declared war on Georgia. Basayev raised his "Abkhazian Battalion" of volunteers and mercenaries to fight Tbilisi.

It was the Abkhazians who had first triggered the Georgian demands for independence. In March 1989, Abkhazian nationalists convened in the village of Lykhny and called for Abkhazian secession from Georgia, and its restoration as an independent state within the Soviet Union. The Abkhazian call prompted a convulsive wave of protest in Georgia, with rallies and hunger strikes that were finally put down by Soviet troops in April 1989. Soon, Georgia had announced its independence. The man riding the crest of the chauvinist wave was Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who, on Nov. 23, 1989, organized a 20,000-man march on Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian capital, to put down the Ossetian bid for secession. In August 1990, the Georgian Supreme Soviet declared that no regionally based parties could vote in upcoming national elections, effectively disenfranchising the Ossetians and Abkhazians. The Ossetians and Abkhazian Supreme Soviets forthwith de-

clared their secession from Georgia.

Gamsakhurdia handily won the October 1990 elections, and opened war against South Ossetia. First, a blockade beginning in December 1990, followed by a massacre of Ossetian civilians in Tskhinvali. Throughout the spring of 1991, as the Community of Independent States was taking shape, the tempo of Georgian and Ossetian clashes and massacres increased. By November, Gamsakhurdia called on "all Georgians who can carry a gun" to march on Nov. 23 on the South Ossetian capital.

The assault was averted by the military coup against Gamsakhurdia that put former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in power. Shevardnadze called a referendum for South Ossetia, but although 90% of the Ossetians voted for unity with North Ossetia within Russia, Georgia did not give way; the clashes continued. When Russia threatened to bomb Tbilisi in June 1992, a cease-fire was declared between Georgia and Moscow. But for the Ossetians, there was no settlement. By the end of the summer, 100,000 Ossetians, virtually the entire Ossetian population of Georgia, had fled to North Ossetia and incorporation into Russia.

If the Ossetian conflict passed by in relative obscurity, not

so the Abkhazian war, which was a *cause célèbre* for the British Foreign Office. In December 1990, secessionist leader Vladislav Ardzinba, a former department director of the Soviet Institute for Oriental Studies with specialization in ancient Anatolian cults, was elected chairman of the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet. In July 1992, one month after the South Ossetian cease-fire, the Abkhazia Supreme Soviet ruled that the 1925 constitution, which called for only a loose treaty relationship with Georgia, was in force. The Georgia State Council declared the ruling invalid. On Aug. 14, the Georgian Army invaded Abkhazia and occupied its capital, Sukhumi. But after the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus declared war on Georgia that month, the Abkhazians began a successful rollback of Georgian troops.

The Confederation, with Chechnya's Dudayev at the helm, claimed the Russians were supporting the Georgian advance against Abkhazia. Their aid to Abkhazia was justified on the basis of a need to stop Russian imperialism. On the other hand, the region's Cossacks also joined the Abkhazian side: the Abkhazian fight against Georgia, the Cossacks said, was important to secure a Greater Russia. For its part, Georgia, which was recruiting volunteers and mercenaries from the Baltic States and from the Ukrainian UNA-UNSO organization, protested that the Abkhazians were operating on behalf of the Russians.

In fact, Russia assisted both sides. Russian military advisers helped draw up Abkhazian battle plans, and Russian-supplied jets were used to bomb Georgian-held Sukhumi. Gen. Pavel Grachov, Russian minister of defense, toured Abkhazia. Abkhazian leader Ardzinba arranged for the redeployment of a Russian airborne assault battalion from the Baltic republics to Sukhumi.

Russia also supplied the Georgian Army. At a press conference at the headquarters of the Transcaucasian Military District in Tbilisi in March 1993, General Diukov announced that his forces would continue to hand over weapons to Georgia as mandated by various Russian-Georgian agreements.

The Abkhaz, however, held the "joker" card—full support from the British "human rights" apparatus. In November 1993, Lord Ennals's UNPO became an official adviser to the Abkhazian leaders, helping the secessionists draw up a new constitution and representing the breakaways before the U.N. After Abkhazian emissaries met with British Lords Avebury and Ennals, a human rights campaign against Georgia was organized.

In July 1993, Georgia, Abkhazia, and Russia signed a cease-fire, which provided for the Georgian withdrawal from Sukhumi. On Sept. 16, Abkhazia broke the cease-fire, with the help of Russian mercenaries and North Caucasian volunteers. The Russian government took no action outside of condemnations.

On Oct. 8, 1993, Shevardnadze agreed to join the CIS, and signed a treaty the next day providing for the lease of Georgian military bases to Russian troops, and the deploy-

ment of these troops to guard strategic roads and railways. In December, his rival, Gamsakhurdia, who had tried to organize an insurrection against Shevardnadze in summer 1993, was murdered by unknown assailants. In February 1994, Georgia and Russia signed a Friendship Treaty which mandated the creation of five Russian military bases in Georgia, and the stationing of Russian border guards along Georgia's border with Turkey.

UNPO plays key role in Transcaucasus blowup

by Mark Burdman

In November 1992, Lord David Ennals led a "fact-finding delegation" to the Caucasus, where he met with the region's top warring leaders: Jokhar Dudayev, exiled Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Eduard Shevardnadze, and Abkhazia's leader Vladislav Ardzinba. The delegation's report launched a British propaganda campaign on behalf of Chechen and Abkhazian secession from Russia.


The mission had been taken on behalf of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO). Lord Ennals, a former British foreign and defense minister, and a member of the House of Lords and the Queen's Privy Council until his death in 1995, was the founder and director of the UNPO's "Urgent Action Council."

The UNPO, based in The Hague, the Netherlands, has become increasingly active on the world stage in the past period, charged with the task of exacerbating strategic crises, particularly aimed at Russia and China. Perceptions among highest-level planners, in both Moscow and Beijing, that there are efforts, from the outside, to break up their respective countries, are reinforced by the activities of such organizations as the UNPO.

UNPO is, in fact, one of the key institutions in the global apparatus of Prince Philip and his World Wide Fund for Nature. The royal consort has put forward the view that the United States, for example, should be broken up into smaller parts, into so-called "bio-regions." The WWF's support for "indigenism," "ecologism," and related movements, leads to the same goal, in other parts of the world.

UNPO was founded in February 1991, on the basis of an initiative by Lodi Gyari, foreign minister of the Dalai Lama's Tibetan exile government, in cooperation with friends in Estonia. The secretary general of UNPO is Michael van Walt van Praag, the son of Dutch diplomats who had become, in earlier years, a Washington lawyer and general

UNPO plots breakup of Russia and China

**Key to Map 13**

The Unrepresented Peoples Organizations "recognizes" some 50 "peoples" and "nations," which, it says, should comprise independent states. Many of these supposed peoples and nations exist within Russia and the CIS nations, China, and border lands. These include:

- | | | |
|---|---------------------|---|
| 1. The Hungarians of Romania | 6. Mari | 20. Assyria |
| 2. Kosova | 7. Tartarstan | 21. Kurdistan |
| 3. The Greeks of Albania | 8. Udmurt | 22. "East Turkestan" (Xinjiang, China) |
| 4. The Ingrian Finns of the St. Petersburg region | 9. Bashkortostan | 23. Tibet |
| 5. Chuvash | 10. Komi | 24. Taiwan |
| | 11. Tuva | 25. Cordillera (Philippines) |
| | 12. Buryat | 26. Mindanao (Philippines) |
| | 13. Yakutia | 27. Moluccas (Indonesia) |
| | 14. Crimean Tartars | 28. West Papua (Indonesia) |
| | 15. Circassia | 29. East Timor (Indonesia) |
| | 16. Abkhazia | 30. Aceh (Indonesia) |
| | 17. Ingushetia | 31. Karenni state (Myanmar) |
| | 18. Chechnya | 32. Nagaland (India) |
| | 19. Iraqi Turkoman | 33. Chittagong Hill Tracts (Bangladesh) |

counsel to the Dalai Lama. He had represented Tibet's case before the U.N. Human Rights Commission. As *EIR* has documented, the Dalai Lama operates as a special agent of British interests, most useful for the destabilization of China and other lands in Asia.

Until recently, van Walt was a board member of the U.S.-based Institute for American Democracy. The so-called "Development Coordinator" of the institute is Elsie Walker, George Bush's first cousin. Not surprisingly, van Walt, to this day, sings the praises of former President Bush's "principled" stand on the Tibet question, whenever the former President dealt with China. He contrasts this, favorably, to the "vacillations" of the Clinton administration, in dealing with Beijing.

The Eurasian geopolitical focus

The UNPO "members list," as of February 1995, included 43 "peoples": Abkhazia; aboriginals of Australia; Acheh-Sumatra; Albanians in Macedonia; Assyria; Batwa (Rwanda); Bougainville; Chechen Republic Ichkeria; Chittagong Hill Tracts; Circassians; Cordillera (Philippines); Chameria; Chuvash; Crimea (Crimean Tatars); East Timor; East Turkestan; Gagauzia; Greek Minority in Albania; Hungarian Minority in Romania; Inkeri; Ingushetia; Iraqi Turkoman; Kalahui Hawaii; Karenni State; Komi; Kosovo; Kurdistan (Iraq); Lakota Nation; Maohi People of French Polynesia; Mapuche; Mari; Nagaland; Ogoni (Nigeria); Sanjak; Scania; Republic of South Moluccas; Taiwan; Tatarstan; Tibet; Udmurt; West Papua; Sakha Republic (Yakutia); Zanzibar.

By February 1996, four more had been added: Baskhor-tostan, Buryatia, the Mon People, and Tuva. Three of these four are in the territory of the Russian Federation.

As can be seen in **Map 13**, the vast majority of members are in the former Soviet Union, China, India, the Balkans, and countries in Asia, especially Indonesia. UNPO's focus of activity may not be unrelated to the fact that it receives part of its funding from the Dutch Foreign Ministry. The Dutch formerly had an empire, with special focus on current UNPO "target" country Indonesia. Since the complicated monarchical rearrangements in Britain beginning in the late seventeenth century, the key imperial power in the world is properly understood as *Anglo-Dutch*, rather than simply British, because Great Britain and Holland became the two most important northern "clones" of the earlier Venetian empire.

Visiting Dudayev's mountain retreat

Vis-à-vis China, UNPO is a key promoter of Tibetan independence. Beyond Tibet, others of its members include Taiwan and "East Turkestan," the name UNPO accords to the Uighur-populated region of China's northwestern Xinjiang province. As for Taiwan, Parris Chang, president of the UNPO steering committee, is a Taiwanese senator from the

British-backed, pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party.

Fifteen of UNPO's members are from the former Soviet Union, mostly in areas of the Russian Federation.

UNPO has a high-profile role in the conflict in Chechnya. To give a flavor of this, one need only cite a July 24, 1995 UNPO press release:

"UNPO General Secretary Michael van Walt spent many hours in discussion with President Dudayev at his mountain headquarters in Chechnya. During the two official meetings, the Chechen President spoke of his commitment to peace, and the desire of the Chechen people for independence for their war-torn republic. Dr. van Walt was in Grozny to attend the talks between the Russians and the Chechens, which appeared to have reached a stalemate due to the issue of Chechen independence. . . . Before attending the negotiations, he visited the neighboring Ingush Republic, where he met with President Aushev, Ingush officials, and humanitarian aid officials."

This was one of many releases issued since December 1994, the time of the Russian invasion of Chechnya. Although sometimes distancing themselves from the UNPO's more extreme acts of violence, such as taking hospital patients hostages, the releases most often read like outbursts from Dudayev's own Ministry of Propaganda.

Covering up the truth

As it does with other such situations, the UNPO intervention is based on fallacy of composition, sin of omission, and misrepresentation of the facts. What purports to be a campaign for oppressed peoples, is really a program to enforce a certain agenda: the elevation of the concept of ethnicity to the highest rank in international political and strategic considerations, and the phasing-out of the sovereign nation-state.

To accomplish its aims, the UNPO must obscure not only its deeper aims, but also the true nature of the situations it is meddling in. In the case of Chechnya, it is no secret that Russian military actions there have been brutal—often, by the way, destroying the fabric of life of Russians, not only Chechens, who live in Grozny and other cities of Chechnya. But given that, and other grievances of the Chechens, UNPO's literature mysteriously omits the well-known fact that Grozny, under Dudayev, has become a focal point of international criminal activity, especially drug trafficking, and terrorism.

Also omitted in UNPO propaganda, is the activity in the Caucasus of British, French, and other operatives, whose efforts inflame the Russians' anger and paranoia.

Breaking up sovereign entities

Van Walt and his circle are playing a delicate game, but one completely coherent with British geopolitical strategy. Much like waving a red flag in front of a bull, they support

separatist-secessionist tendencies, counting on the Russians, mainland Chinese, and others (e.g., Indonesians) to react according to a profile of their usual proclivities under such situations, namely, to brutally suppress the "ethnicity" movements in question. The suppression has the short- to medium-term effect of dissuading these and potentially other movements from challenging "the center," but has the longer-term effect, it is calculated, of fuelling a mood of revolt. It is a classic trap, utilized repeatedly by the British imperialists to break up other nations or empires over the past decades.

One would wish that the leaders of nations targetted in such a strategy would break profile, and act with greater sophistication and adeptness. One element of such a more sophisticated strategy, would be to punish less the populations and peoples involved, and to focus more on exposing the higher-level institutions, including the UNPO, which are manipulating or controlling the insurrections from outside.

The ultimate aim of van Walt is unambiguous.

Speaking of Russia, for example, he affirms: "What happens in Russia, is very dependent on what will happen at the center of power, how the power struggles will be resolved. The situation there is very unstable, with many peoples simply waiting for the opportunity to break out, or get some autonomy. The Chechen war was supposed to nip this in the bud, but it has changed everything, with the exactly opposite effect. Russia is becoming a test case, in which statehood is being redefined, and in which local authorities are demonstrating extensive rights on the international level. Places like Bashkiristan, Tatarstan, are establishing their individual trade relations abroad, and defining their own rights. Whole sectors of Russia are moving in this direction."

"Russia is caught in a bit of a Catch-22," he said. "They ostensibly started the war in Chechnya, using the excuse that 'Chechen separatism' would create a precedent, with other peoples doing the same. But, in fact, as we said from the start, Russia's military action will precipitate the splitting up of Russia. We have 14 member-peoples in UNPO from the former Soviet Union, most of them inside the Russian Republic. For the moment, they are all scared that if they do something, they will be treated like the Chechens. But at the same time, they have had an awakening, that the issue is not, in fact, *communism*, as they always thought it was, but Russian imperialism."

Van Walt also believes that Indonesia is heading for break-up.

As for China, Van Walt asserts that the country will have a hard time holding together "in the long run." The immediate challenge would be from "the determination of Taiwan to preserve its de facto independence. . . . This, in turn, and over time, will affect the situations in Tibet and Xinjiang. Here, like in Russia, the outcome will depend on the outcome of the power struggles in China itself."

Or, as he stated in a recent discussion: "Russia and China are either not going to survive in their present state structures,

or they will survive, but only through major changes in their constitutional set-up, by beginning from the bottom up, rather than the top down, in dealing with various of their peoples."

With help from von Hapsburg

UNPO has built up some curious allies. While it presumes to be "liberal," it has developed close working relations with the Pan-European Union, headed by Otto von Hapsburg. In October 1995, UNPO and PEU held parallel conferences in Estonia. The participants in both conferences were representatives from 14 "peoples" that had been invited to Estonia by UNPO. The PEU "line" on the future of Russia is almost identical, word for word, to that of van Walt and UNPO.

Another group with which UNPO cooperates closely, is the Copenhagen-based International Working Group in Indigenous Affairs. IWGIA was founded at the International Congress of Americanists in 1967. Like UNPO, IWGIA receives funds from Scandinavian "aid" organizations, including Denmark's Danida and Norway's NORAD, and from certain of the Scandinavian churches.

On Oct. 9-11, 1995, IWGIA held a conference in Chiang-mai, Thailand, on the theme "Asian Indigenous and Mountain and Hill Peoples." The conference was financially supported by NORAD and Danida. Representative "indigenous" groups there included the Naga and other peoples of India, Bangladesh, and Nepal; the "Cordillera Peoples Alliance" of the Philippines; "Taiwan Aborigines"; and various "indigenous activists" and government officials from Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Burma, and Vietnam.

The event focussed on a "Declaration on the Rights of Asian Indigenous Tribal Peoples," a draft of which states that one key aim is to fight "development aggression," which involves "the encroachment to our lands for logging, mining, hydroelectric dams, geothermal and nuclear energy projects, including nuclear waste dumping, national parks, industrial zones, agribusiness projects, and tourism. As the traditional custodians of the regions' rainforests, land, water, and the resources therein, which are being exploited ruthlessly by commercial firms causing extensive damage to environment, we assert that the world can benefit from our experience, in the management of nature for a sustainable future."

The declaration, "We Are of the Land," asserted that these peoples are "distinct from the rest of the prevailing society. . . . We assert the right to our identities which are linked to our territories and ancestral domain. We assert our right to the full control of our lands, as the foundation of our existence, our customary laws, and indigenous social systems. . . . We assert the right to determine the form of self-government, the rights to uphold indigenous political systems, the right to engage in foreign relations and trade, the right to form alliances and federations with other indigenous peoples, for ushering a life of peace and security, and for pursuing our common goal."

A rogue's gallery

Lord Avebury (Eric Lubbock), chairman of the British Parliament's Human Rights Committee. Avebury is active in supporting all sides in the "Arc of Crisis" region bordering the former Soviet Union. His ancestor, the first Lord Avebury, was a banker to the British royal family in the mid-nineteenth century; his maternal line, the Stanleys, have dominated the British Foreign Office for the last two centuries. Lord Avebury's cousin, Lord Stanley, was British colonial secretary during World War II. Lord Avebury is:

- a top lobbyist for Chechen independence from Russia, and Abkhazian independence from Georgia, according to diplomatic representatives of both causes. He has traveled to both places on "fact-finding" trips to publicize the secessionist cause;
- together with Baroness Cox and their Christian Solidarity International, the leading international advocate of the Armenian claim to Nagorno-Karabakh, which led to war with Azerbaijan;
- the top lobbyist for an independent Kurdistan, carved out of Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, according to spokesmen for that movement, and works together with the terrorist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK);
- the top lobbyist for the Iraqi-based Mujahideen-e-Khalq, an Iranian communist organization seeking to overthrow the government of Iran;
- the top international lobbyist for the Kashmir separatist movements destabilizing India and Pakistan;
- a top lobbyist for Tibetan independence from China;
- a top supporter of the Shiite Islamic Liberation Front of Bahrain;
- a leading supporter of Islamist efforts to topple the ruling Saudi family, and install a regime allegedly more committed to following the strict tenets of Islam.

Count Alexandre Bennigsen: Until his death in the early 1990s, Professor Bennigsen was a primary analyst and advocate of the Sufi-Islamic revival in the Soviet Union. In such books as *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State* (1983) and *Mystics and Commissars: Sufism in the Soviet Union* (1985), Bennigsen claimed that this coming revival would lead to the collapse of the Soviet Union. He also predicted this revival would begin in Chechnya and Dagestan.

Bennigsen was a member of a centuries-old Baltic noble family that had been employed in the czarist diplomatic and intelligence services. One of his ancestors murdered Czar Paul I in 1801. His father was a czarist intelligence official in Central Asia. One of his cousins was the founder of the Social Revolutionaries assassination squads, another was an aide to Leon Trotsky, and a third was a senior member of the czarist secret police. Following World War I, Bennigsen's family



Baroness Caroline Cox is the leading international promoter of the Armenian claim to Nagorno-Karabakh.

moved to France, where he became an Orientologist at the Sorbonne. Bennigsen was a mentor to Bernard Lewis, and reportedly taught several of Ayatollah Khomeini's associates. Bennigsen's daughter, Marie Broxup, has followed in his footsteps and is today editor of the British journal *Central Asian Survey*; in January 1996, she conducted a tour of Dagestan.

Baroness Caroline Cox: The deputy speaker of the House of Lords, and co-chairman of Christian Solidarity International, Baroness Cox is the leading international promoter of the Armenian claim to Nagorno-Karabakh. She has undertaken at least a dozen missions there since 1991. She depicts the conflict as an apocalyptic struggle between Islam and Christianity. She is also the leading international defender of the insurrection in southern Sudan, which she characterizes in the same terms. Her closest collaborator in Russia is Galina Starovoitova, formerly President Boris Yeltsin's ethnic affairs adviser, who espouses the idea that Russia should break up into 72 different States. Baroness Cox was elevated to the peerage by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, a major patron of Azerbaijan.

A psychiatric nurse by training, Baroness Cox served as a British intelligence liaison to the Polish Solidarity movement in the 1980s, before her involvement in Armenia and Sudan. Christian Solidarity International is an outgrowth of Keston College, Oxford, the publisher of *Religion in Communist Lands*, since renamed *Religion and State*. The college, which is patronized by Prince Philip, specialized in using religion to destabilize the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. It has continued that work in the same region since the Soviet Union's demise, particularly seeking to inflame Protestant-Orthodox and Catholic-Orthodox tensions.

David Urquhart's Ottoman legions

by Joseph Brewda

After fomenting the Caucasian Mountain Peoples' uprising, David Urquhart returned to England in the 1830s, intent on rallying public feeling for a war with Russia. His "Foreign Affairs Committees," and their organ *Portfolio*, were dedicated to raising public awareness of the "Eastern Question." Urquhart's answer to this question was to take the Ottoman Empire under London's protection, and arrange the collision, and mutual destruction, of the Ottoman and Russian empires.

Hurling Turkey at Russia required urgent reform of the Ottoman State bureaucracy and modernization of its army. It also required the creation of a new imperial, anti-Russian ideology. Lord Palmerston himself supervised the reforms of the Ottoman Empire in the 1840s, and the expansion of a civil service bureaucracy educated and indoctrinated in Paris and London. In 1864, Giuseppe Mazzini, one of Palmerston's agents, provided the cadre for the new ideology by forming the Young Ottomans in Paris, largely administered by his Young Poland organization, and dedicated to forming a Turkish-Eastern European-Transcaucasian alliance against Russia.

Urquhart was the chief British case officer of the Young Ottoman movement, having from the 1830s worked for Turkish-Polish collaboration against Russia. Until 1876, when the Young Ottomans succeeded in seizing power in Istanbul for one year, Urquhart served as their adviser. Among other duties, he was paymaster for Young Ottoman leader Ali Suavi, a dominant figure in their Paris-based exile publication, *Hurriyet*.

Orchestrating a showdown

There were two ideological movements the British created in the mid-nineteenth century to motivate Ottoman imperial wars with Russia. One was the Pan-Islamic movement. The other was the Pan-Turkic movement. The Young Ottomans proselytized both.

Pan-Turkism, the mission to unite all Turkic peoples based on their common ethnic origin, and antipathy to Russia, was concocted by Urquhart's crony Arminius Vambery, a Hungarian Jewish emigré also in the pay of Lord Palmerston.

Disguised as a Turkish dervish, Vambery traveled

throughout Central Asia in the 1860s to investigate possibilities for creating a Pan-Turkic, anti-Russian, identity, unified around the sultan of the Ottoman Empire. His conclusion was optimistic, even though Central Asia had never been under Ottoman rule.

Vambery's Ottoman imperial vision was proclaimed in his 1865 *Travels in Central Asia*: "In its character of Turkish dynasty, the house of Osman might, out of the different kindred elements with which it is connected by the bond of a common language, religion, and history, have founded an empire extending from the shore of the Adriatic far into China, an empire mightier than that which the great Romanoff was obliged to employ not only force, but cunning, to put together, out of the most discordant and heterogeneous materials. Anatolians, Azerbaydjanes, Turkomans, Özbegs, Kirghis, and Tartars are the respective members, out of which a mighty Turkish Colossus might have arisen, certainly better capable of measuring itself with its great northern competitor than Turkey such as we see it in the present day."

In its more extravagant form, Vambery's doctrine was known as "Pan-Turanianism," and sought to ally the Turkic peoples with the Hungarians, Finns, and Mongols.

The man who emerged as the leader of the Pan-Turkic movement was Urquhart's protégé Ali Suavi, who had traveled to Britain under Urquhart's sponsorship. In his writings in *Hurriyet* and other locations, Suavi argued that the movement was necessary to mobilize the Ottomans in defense of the Central Asian Khans, then under military threat by the expanding Russian Empire. Suavi was the first to use the term "Turk" to describe the "Ottomans," which in previous usage had been an Ottoman pejorative term for their backward Central Asian cousins. Suavi was killed in an aborted effort to depose the sultan in 1876, sponsored by British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli.

Pan-Islamism, which advanced the idea that Istanbul was the natural center of the entire Islamic world, and not just the Turkic peoples, was a brother-doctrine of the same British mother. It, too, sought to turn the Ottoman sultan into the rallying point for a struggle against Russia, this time robed in religious garb. The British myth-spinners of pan-Islamism were the family of cult novelist Edmund Bulwer-Lytton, and Wilfred Scawen Blunt, the 1870s founder of the British Arab Bureau.

The birth announcement of the pan-Islamic movement appeared first in 1869, in the pages of the Young Ottomans' Paris-based *Hurriyet*. It castigated the Ottoman Empire for its non-committal attitude toward the Central Asian Khanates under Russian attack. But rather than appealing to ethnic solidarity, it avowed that the sultan, as caliph—the defender of the faith—was responsible for defending Central Asia. The pan-Islamic proselytizer for the Young Ottomans was Tahsin Efendi, who, after studying in Paris in the 1850s, returned to form the Sufi "Society for the Study of Geography in Islamic Lands," a geographical pan-Islamic organizing society.

The Young Ottomans' revival

For one brief year, 1876, the Young Ottomans ruled in Istanbul, with their leader, Midhat Pasha, replacing the grand vizier. But in 1877, they were ousted, driven underground, and forced into exile. With succor offered by London, however, the movement did not die. By 1896, the Young Ottomans were resuscitated as the "Young Turks," who seized power over the Ottoman Empire in a British-sponsored coup in 1908. Evidently lacking self-confidence, the Young Turks appointed a British general as chief of staff of the Turkish Army.

The Young Turks' ideology, Pan-Turkism, put Turkey on a collision course with its Slavic neighbors. By 1912, the Young Turks had instigated the first Balkan war, unleashing the events that led to World War I.

The mastermind of the Young Turk regime was Emmanuel Carasso, an Italian Jew and grand master of the "Macedonia Resurrected" freemasonic Lodge of Salonika, which had plotted the 1908 coup. Carasso had supervised the procurement of Turkey's food supplies, in league with the international arms trafficker, grain speculator, Bolshevik financial patron, and British super-agent, Alexander Helphand Parvus.

Just as Urquhart had been the mentor for Karl Marx's crusade against Russia, so Parvus had spent a lifetime logistically facilitating the Marxist movement that would ultimately bring down the Russian Empire. Taking advantage of the shattering effects of the 1902 Russo-Japanese War, Parvus funded and oversaw the 1905 Russian Revolution. His agent had been Leon Trotsky, whom he had drilled in the doctrine of "permanent revolution," leading to Trotsky's book on the theme.

From Russia, Parvus arrived in Turkey soon after the 1908 Young Turk revolution. To grease the wheels of his various political operations, he joined with Carasso to become the top grain speculator in Turkey. He also became financial editor of the Young Turk newspaper, *Türk Yurdu*.

Later, Parvus took some of the money he had acquired in Turkey, and gold from the German General Staff, to finance the 1917 Russian Revolution and arrange for Vladimir Lenin's triumphant return to Russia.

Another foreign mentor of the Young Turk regime was the Polish Jew Vladimir Jabotinsky, who became editor of the newspaper, *Young Turk*. Jabotinsky would later become the founder of the branch of the Zionist movement that spawned the Likud Party of Israel and its offshoots, those Zionists attempting to block the Middle East peace process today.

The Young Turk regime did not last. The tables were turned with the rise of Turkish nationalist leader Mustapha Kemal Atatürk and the founding of the Turkish Republic, in the aftermath of World War I. The Young Turk leadership fled Turkey again, this time to Azerbaijan and Central Asia. Today, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has been called into action—again.

The neo-Ottoman trap for Turkey

by Joseph Brewda

On Jan. 16, 1996, a nine-man team of Chechens and Abkhazians based in Turkey, seized a ferry boat carrying 100 Russian tourists, in the Turkish port of Trabzon. In an interview, the terror team leader, Mohamed Tokhan, demanded, "We want the complete independence of the northern Caucasus, otherwise there will be war." He said he was acting in sympathy with the Chechen terrorists then holding 3,000 civilians hostage at a hospital in Kizlyar, Dagestan. Tokhan himself is a veteran of the Chechen militia, and fought in both Chechnya and Abkhazia.


The Russian Foreign Ministry reacted quickly to Tokhan's provocation, warning the next day: "We have informed the Turkish side more than once about the dangerous anti-Russian activity of the extremist part of the Chechen diaspora and emissaries of [Chechen rebel leader Gen. Jokhar] Dudayev on the territory of Turkey. It is this activity which has led to this big-scale act of terrorism." Two days later, Russian President Boris Yeltsin complained to the press that Turkey was "dragging its feet." He said he had sent 150 military scuba-divers to Trabzon for possible use against the Chechen terrorists. A few hours later, the ferry boat hijackers surrendered without bloodshed.

Nevertheless, the incident highlights how swiftly local wars in the Caucasus can become a point of conflict between two far greater powers, Russia and Turkey. That was the Chechen aim in seizing the ferry. "If the events which are now taking place in Chechnya continue, the balance of forces will change, and the war will spread to Turkey," Dudayev told the Turkish daily *Sabah*, from his hideout on Feb. 11. "This is how the Third World War will start."

Such a spread of the war is also an objective of British intelligence. The geopolitical aim is not only to use the Caucasus's ethnic conflicts to bring about a reactive neo-imperial tilt in Russia, but to use the Caucasus proxies to accomplish the identical shift in Turkey, to a neo-Ottoman impulse—setting both countries once again on the track toward confrontation.

The Bernard Lewis network

The senior British case officer for accomplishing the neo-Ottoman revival in Turkey is retired professor Bernard Lewis, a career British intelligence official originally ensconced at the London School of Oriental and African Studies (formerly the School of Colonial Studies), who transferred to Princeton



British intelligence officer Bernard Lewis (above) is determined to bury the legacy of Turkish nationalist leader Mustapha Kemal Ataturk (left), who blocked British plans to completely destroy the Mideast after World War I.

University in New Jersey, where he is now a professor emeritus. Lewis's writings, such as *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, published in 1960, have long functioned as encouragement for Turkey to step forward as a regional superpower. In January 1996, for instance, Lewis insisted to a bankers' conference in Ankara, Turkey, that there is a "vacuum in the region which Turkey should and must fill."

To revive dreams of an Ottoman empire, Lewis must first destroy the legacy of Mustapha Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, who decisively blocked British plans to shatter the Mideast in the aftermath of World War I. Ataturk combined his strategic outflanking of British designs in the 1920s, with a strong emphasis on the necessity of Turkey's adopting Western science, technology, and education—a stance that has further incensed the British. Ataturk had crushed the Pan-Turkic and Pan-Islamic movements of the 1920s, and banned the various religious and freemasonic orders that fed them.


Ataturk knew well that both the Pan-Turkic and Pan-Islamic movements had as their source his nation's primary enemy: London.

Hence, for Lewis et al., the burial of Ataturk's legacy is no academic matter. On March 8, 1996, Lewis was present at a conference of the American-Turkish Council in Washington, D.C., dedicated to goading the Turkish military into a neo-Ottoman stance. Alan Makovsky, a former State Department official and now an executive with the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), called on Turkey to expand its horizon, now that the Soviet Union is eclipsed. Ataturk's slogan of "Peace at home, peace abroad," is "passivist and

isolationist." Makovsky told his audience, which included senior Turkish military officers. Turkey, Makovsky urged, must ally with Israel and Jordan to check Syria, and must also pursue its own designs for hegemony in the Balkans and Central Asia.

Makovsky's attack on Ataturk went unchallenged at the Turkish-American Council meeting, a measure of the progress in forcing the adoption of a neo-Ottoman geopolitical vision within the Turkish military establishment. The neo-Ottoman revival was first heralded with the May 1992 conference in New York City of the World Turkic Congress, under the chairmanship of Ata Erim, former leader of the New York Turkish Federation. Also leading the event was Heath Lowery, who succeeded Lewis as the premier Turcologist at Princeton University, after serving as a CIA section chief in Istanbul during the Carter administration.

The keynote address was given not by a Turk, but by Justin McCarthy of the University of Kentucky, who remarked during his speech that "Lowery is everything he is today because of me." The target of McCarthy's oration was Russia, which he accused of having used "exemplary terrorism" to drive the Turks out of the Caucasus and Europe, from the eighteenth century up to the present. Russia's inflicting of massacres and genocide against Turkey, he said, through forced migrations and insurgencies, can no longer be ignored. The demise of the Soviet Union has changed nothing, he said. "The U.N. intervened to protect the Croats, but will do nothing about the Bosnians, or the Azeri victims of Armenian aggression. No one is doing anything about Serbian and Armenian expansionism."



Master of ceremonies for the Quincentennial Foundation's celebration was British agent of influence Henry A. Kissinger.

Gamidov imprisoned.

Russia is not the only target. Iran has captured Pan-Turkic nationals agitating Iranian Azerbaijan. Reportedly, Nizami Alem is active there, with the Turkish military's commando group Counterguerrilla.

The republics of Central Asia are also targets. Enver Altayli, the former head of the Gray Wolves in Germany and a former editor of the group's newspaper, has been an adviser to the Uzbek President Islam Karimov since 1993.

The Quincentennial Foundation

Despite its neo-Ottoman fanaticism and unsavory activities, the Gray Wolves/Nizami Alem nexus in Turkey has very prestigious international backers, who emerged into the light of day at the April 1992 gala celebration of the Quincentennial Foundation. The foundation had been created in 1989 to organize the 500th anniversary celebration, in 1992, of the Ottoman Empire's acceptance of Jews who had fled Spain. Both President Özal and Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel came to the New York event, where they received awards from the event's master of ceremonies, Henry Kissinger, a man who professed in May 1982 that his first loyalty was to the British Foreign Office, even above his loyalty to the American President.

According to Steve Shalom, a member of a prominent Ottoman family and the gala's organizer, Quincentennial's other goal was to foster a strategic deal between Turkey and Israel, against common enemies in the Mideast, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.

Quincentennial's founder is Jak Kamhi, a wealthy businessman in Turkish-occupied Northern Cyprus, a depot for

arms and mercenaries for the Caucasus. His son, Jefe, is a business partner with Tugrul Turkes, son of Gray Wolves chief Gen. Alparslan Turkes.

Other founders of the foundation include:

- Edmond Safra, the Aleppo Syrian Jew who has reportedly come under U.S. federal investigation for laundering drug money through his banks, American Express, Republic National Bank, and Safra Bank;
- Meshulam Riklis, the now bankrupt Turkish Jewish patron of Israeli Gen. Ariel Sharon;
- Turkish businessman Selahattin Beyazit, the head of the Turkish affiliate of the World Wildlife Fund of Britain's Prince Philip;
- Ahmet Ertegun, the Turkish founder and chairman of Atlantic Records;
- Howard Squadron, the New York attorney for Ariel Sharon and former head of the American Jewish Congress; and
- Abraham Sofaer, the former counsel for the U.S. State Department during the Reagan-Bush administrations, currently being investigated for influence-peddling.

Sufi orders revived

In 1995, the Quincentennial Foundation's Ahmet Ertegun traveled to Turkey with Kissinger. During the trip, Ertegun led ceremonies to reopen an Uzbek *tekke*, a Sufi monastery that had been outlawed by Atatürk.

Ertegun's purpose was political rather than religious. The Sufi orders had dominated the old Ottoman Empire, especially the military. This is well understood in both London and Moscow. On March 19, the Russian newspaper *Chas Pik*, which supports the Dudayev rebellion in Chechnya, advertised a volume of the Sufi mystic of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Ibn Al Arabi. The ad enthusiastically notes that in the late 1960s, "British young people founded the Ibn Al Arabi Society in Oxford," and relates that the mystic's teaching "served as a base for the struggle of Muslims with the Russian culture, and the political invasion into the Caucasus and Central Asia long before the revolution. . . . The bitter reality of the last year demonstrates that, although political clashes are motivated by also political and economic mercantilism, the process and the outcome of this struggle is to a greatest extent defined by the conflict of mentalities, philosophies, ideologies."

In that regard, it is London's hope that a Sufi revival will advance British geopolitical aims.

The Naqshbandi order, formed in Central Asia in the sixteenth century, is today the most powerful Sufi order in Turkey and includes many Dagestanis and Chechens; it promotes the cause of Chechen secessionism internationally.

One branch of the Naqshbandi is the Fathullahcilar Order, named after its leader, Imam Fathullah. In the Caucasus and Central Asia, the Fathullahcilar has been funding schools. Its media empire centers around the newspaper *Zaman*, which

has a circulation of 300,000 and editorially supports Dudayev's revolt. The Fathullahcilar Order works with Rev. Sun Myung Moon's Unification Church, whose activity in Central Asia has recently been registered. One of the case officers for the Fathullahcilar is Graham Fuller, who worked at the Mideast desk at the National Security Council during the Reagan-Bush administration and had a hand in Bush's Iran-Contra operation. Fuller, now with the Rand Corporation, traveled to Turkey last fall to help mobilize the Sufi orders in support of the Welfare Party.

The Helveti-Jerrahi order is another Turkish-based Sufi organization that has far-flung and prestigious international connections. Its premier financial patron is Philippa Frederick, daughter of Jean and Dominique (née Schlumberger) de Menil, of the Texas and French-based Schlumberger oil-drilling equipment firm. The Schlumbergers have a long history of involvement in Anglo-French intelligence operations in Russia. The family's Rothko Chapel in Houston, through which the Helveti-Jerrahi Order works in the United States, played a key supporting role in bringing Ayatollah Khomeini to power in Iran.

A popular cause

The main route, however, through which the visions of an Ottoman revival have come into the consciousness of the Turkish people is through the Welfare Party, led by Prof. Necmettin Erbakan, son of an Ottoman cleric and a member of the Naqshbandi Sufi order. The party, which puts itself forward as Pan-Islamist, won the highest plurality of votes (23%) in the December 1995 election. Erbakan campaigned with the promise to "liberate Bosnia, Azerbaijan, Chechnya, and Jerusalem." He has also called for forming an "Islamic NATO," presumably including Iran, the former Soviet Central Asian republics, Azerbaijan, and the breakaway Russian Muslim republics.

The Welfare Party came to the fore following the 1991 Persian Gulf war, which bankrupted and humiliated Turkey. The savage economic policies of Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, a protégé of Margaret Thatcher, have also fueled the party's rise.

The party's director of intelligence is Gen. Sami Karasimir, the former head of the Turkish Army's Special Warfare Department, who joined the Welfare Party in 1992, and has since recruited some 50 high-ranking officers, including generals.

The foundation of the party's foreign policy was summarized by deputy chairman Abdullah Gul, in a March 20 interview with the Swedish Radio Network: "We would most of all like to create a new Ottoman Empire again, where Turkey would be heading the previously Turkish Islamic provinces in southern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. . . . They were our provinces, just 80 years before." The interviewer noted that Gul is "regarded as one of the moderate, least anti-Western forces in the Welfare Party."

Pan-Turks target China's Xinjiang

by Joseph Brewda

In April 1992, the town of Baren, in the Chinese province of Xinjiang, went into revolt, resulting in at least 22 deaths. The uprising was led by the Free East Turkestan Movement, a Pan-Turkic organization run out of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. According to Chinese authorities, the movement's members are Uighurs and Kyrgyz, who had acquired arms and training from the Afghan mujahideen.

Xinjiang has long been a target of British intelligence—with London hoping to manipulate the Uighur refugees from Xinjiang and Uighurs still there, into cannon fodder for London's plans to break up China, as per the maps published by Gerald Segal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 1994, for the division of China into three countries.

Xinjiang's vulnerability lies in the fact that in 1949, when the Maoist revolution took power in Beijing, Xinjiang's population was 95% Uighur (Turkic) and 5% Han. Today, nearly 50% of the 16 million population is Han. Xinjiang was first the repository for some 2 million Kuomintang troops who could not make it to Taiwan, and then for a second wave of Han migration, after the 1957 Great Leap Forward. During the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76, unemployed city youth were banished to Xinjiang, as well as millions of political undesirables. At that point, a half-million Uighurs from Xinjiang simply packed up and moved to adjacent Soviet republics.

Xinjiang has China's largest deposits of oil, uranium, gold, jade, and other raw materials.

Since the Uighur population is Turkic, the Pan-Turkic movement is to serve as midwife for a secessionist Xinjiang, with assistance from Islamic organizations headquartered in Pakistan and Turkey.

In December 1992, the National Congress of Turks of East Turkestan held its first conference in Istanbul. Isa Yusef Alptekin, conference chairman, had led a bloody Uighur revolt against the Chinese in 1945. He had been a Gray Wolves official since World War II, and was given the honor of being the president of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization of Lord Ennals et al.

Alptekin told the audience that the recent collapse of the Soviet Union meant "the time for collapse and dissolution has arrived for the Chinese empire. We expect help from our beloved Turkey, our new republics [in former Soviet Central Asia], co-religionists, and mankind in general, to put a check on China."

Namik Kemal Zeybek, Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel's adviser on Central Asian affairs, addressed the conference. "We must be prepared for these developments," he said, referring to Alptekin's forecast, "Let no one doubt that fortune will smile on East Turkestan." Gray Wolves leader Gen. Alparslan Turkes was also present, telling the audience that "Chinese imperialism's repression of East Turkestan must not be tolerated."

Beijing is acutely aware of the problem. In April 1994, Prime Minister Li Peng toured the Central Asian republics, to discuss trade and cooperation, and, reported one British outlet, "to silence groups campaigning for the independence of Xinjiang." But the Pan-Turkic movement has set up shop. Yusupbek Muglisi, head of the United National Revolutionary Front for Eastern Turkestan, based in Kazakhstan, told the press during Li Peng's tour, "We have decided to use all possible means, including terrorism, to bring out revolution in Xinjiang." As one Gray Wolves journalist, who frequently traveled to Central Asia, told *EIR*, "We are now using Kyrgyzstan as a base for operations in Xinjiang, just as we used Turkey as a base for operations in the Caucasus."

The "East Turkestan" movement is also finding help among Saudi-funded organizations in Pakistan connected to the Afghan mujahideen, a connection signaled when several hundred Uighur militants attended a conference of the Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan last fall. Uighurs were among the recruits to the Afghan mujahideen in the fight against Soviet-run Kabul during the 1980s.

The British case officer for Xinjiang appears to be William Peters, a former British deputy high commissioner in Bombay, former ambassador to Malawi and Uruguay, and chairman of the Commonwealth Heads of State meeting in Singapore in 1971. Today, in his retirement, he amuses himself as chairman of the Leprosy and Tibet Society. In 1991, after a tour of Xinjiang, he wrote his optimistic forecast of rebellion in *Asian Affairs*:

"To the south and east [of Xinjiang] lies Tibet. Stories of the Tibetan resistance filter through to Kashgar and its neighbors. . . . To the northeast, Uighurs see the moves toward multipolarity in Outer Mongolia and hear about unrest among Mongols in Inner Mongolia. On the western side . . . there is no telling what direction semi-independent republics in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzia, and Uzbekistan might move vis-à-vis China. If there is any truth in the story of military help from Kyrgyz across the border for their fellow tribesmen in Xinjiang, this thought will be all the stronger. . . . A few Uighurs have heard of the Joint Committee for the Manchu, Mongol, East Turkmen and Tibetan Peoples and are particularly anxious to obtain by whatever means possible the Committee's publication *One Voice*. They have some links with Isa Alptekin, leader of the Turkestan Liberation Movement. . . . It is noteworthy that Alptekin's son Erkin Alptekin took an active part in the International Convention on Tibet in London from 6 to 8 July (1990).

"The conjunction of revived minority discontent on both national and religious grounds, of improved access across the frontier to fellow tribesmen, of major political change in neighboring countries, and of the sustained world reaction against genocide, colonialism, and apartheid, creates a situation in Central Asia in which radical change is just possible. . . . The present campaign to arouse world opinion on the subject of genocide, colonialism, and apartheid in China could be the lever which pries out from a Politburo due for change radical concessions in areas such as Xinjiang and Tibet."

Another person concerned to "rouse world opinion" on Xinjiang is Elsie Walker, a first cousin of George Bush and head of Asians for Democracy. In October 1994, Alptekin attended a conference in New York City of the Allied Committee of the Peoples of Eastern Turkestan, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, organized by Walker's outfit.

In its official announcement of the conference, the Tibetan government-in-exile declared: "This conference is being organized to let the international public know that in the uncertainty, instability, and even turmoil in China, that may result from the death of strongman Deng Xiaoping, the struggle to regain the freedom of these three peoples [Tibetans, Turkes-tanis, and Mongols] from communist China domination will be pursued relentlessly."

London's 19th-century afghansi

by Joseph Brewda

In June 1877, two months into the Russo-Turkish war, Turkish Sultan Abdul Hamid sent a mission to the Emir of Afghanistan seeking to enlist the Emir's support against Russia.

Between 1869 and 1876, Russia had been steadily encroaching on Central Asia, annexing or reducing to dependency Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand, and advancing toward Afghanistan, and British India. In 1876, London devised its counterstrategy. Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli appointed Lord Lytton viceroy of India, to inaugurate a "forward policy" of seizing southern Afghanistan. The same year, Disraeli sent Austen Henry Layard to Istanbul, to induce the Sultan to join with Britain against the Russian advance. Layard took credit for the Sultan's mission to Kabul, reporting to Disraeli that he had "induced the Sultan to send an envoy to Afghanistan to counteract the Russian policy of the Ameer and to promote that of England. . . . The Turkish Govt, is, no doubt, trying to get up a kind of Mohammedan league or confederation of states in defence of Islam and against Russia."

In a follow-up communiqué, Layard emphasized that "the Sultan still exercises a very great influence over the Mohammedan world and it is greatly to the interest of a government that has some 40 or 50 million of Mussulman subjects to be well with him. We should have no difficulty in making him understand that we have common interests in C. Asia and we have in him a very useful and valuable ally."

Although the Turkish mission failed to win concrete results, it was enough to cause concern in the Russian Foreign Ministry, which complained to the British Ambassador to St. Petersburg, Lord Loftus, that Britain seemed intent on organizing a religious crusade of the Muslim population of Central Asia against Russia. As one Russian strategist voiced his worry, "If, for instance it were possible for any individual to stand at the head of a Mahomedan confederation, such an individual is to be found in the person of the Sultan of Turkey alone, and the existing alliance and cordial agreement over which indissolubly bind Turkey and England, render a protectorate of these powers a serious menace to Russia."

In 1877, simultaneous with the Sultan's mission to Afghanistan, an Ottoman official received a letter from a Persian adventurer named Jamal ad-Deen al-Afghani proposing that he go to Central Asia to incite revolt against Russia.

Al-Afghani promised his Ottoman addressee that he would "emphasize Russia's aims and convey with an eloquent

tongue, that if, God forbid, a calamity befalls the Ottoman government, neither will permanence remain to Mecca, nor majesty to Medina, and not even the name of Islam or a rite of the faith will survive. . . . I will call them to revenge, and incite the pride of their Turkish race and carry the banner of the Unity of Islam on my shoulder into those regions also and call to religious war, and as usual not overlook any strategem or ruse, and plant the seed of ardor and zeal within them, always working with the wisest ulama. I have no doubt that all the Muslims will attack the Russians enthusiastically."

Al-Afghani may have been taking dictation, however. At the time he sent this letter, he was living in Egypt, where he was on extremely close terms with the British vice-consul in Cairo, Raphael Borg, who inducted him into the Eastern Star lodge in Cairo, a branch of the United Grand Lodge of England. Only a year after his attempt to put himself at the services of the Ottoman Empire, Al-Afghani was made Grandmaster of the Eastern Star lodge. In 1883, Al-Afghani went on the personal payroll of Wilfred Scawen Blunt, a descendant of a founder of the Bank of England, a political crony of "forward strategist" Lord Lytton, Viceroy of India, and the first chief of the "Arab Bureau," created in 1882 for the purpose of dismantling the Ottoman Empire.

In 1885, Blunt dispatched al-Afghani on a six-month tour of Britain. The purpose of al-Afghani's tour, the Arab Bureau chief wrote, was "to organize an Islamic revolutionary alliance with the British Empire." Al-Afghani's first meeting was with Randolph Churchill, then secretary of state for India and father of the future Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Blunt reports in his diaries that al-Afghani proposed to the elder Churchill: "You must make an alliance with Islam, with the Afghans, the Persians, the Turks, the Egyptians, the Arabs; you must drive Russia back out of Merv to the Caspian sea. . . . You should attack them [Russians] not through Afghanistan but by the other side [i.e., Persia]; then the Mollahs would preach a jihad to join you against the Russians."

Churchill agreed, and al-Afghani was detailed to accompany Sir Henry Drummond Wolff on a special mission to Turkey "with a view," Blunt wrote, "to his exercising his influence with the Pan-Islamic entourage of [Sultan] Abdul Hamid in favour of a settlement which should include the evacuation of Egypt, and an English alliance against Russia with Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan."

Why the Afghanistan war does not end

by Susan B. Maitra and Ramtanu Maitra

It is almost eight years since the Soviet Army left Afghanistan, defeated and humiliated, and three and a half years since the once-mighty Soviet Union ceased to exist. Yet Afghans continue to kill each other under the name of a holy war, and, at this time, there appears to be no end in sight to the murderous fratricide.

At first it appeared as if the pure Sunni Pushtun, Hezbe Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, once the blue-eyed boy of the Reagan administration and receiver of immense fortunes in cash and expensive armaments from many sources, was on his way to capture power militarily in the capital city, Kabul. Later, when Hekmatyar faltered, the press projected that the former Communist general, Abdur Rashid Dostum, an Afghan of Uzbek origin who leads a ruthless militia, Jum-bush-e-Milli, and controls the area around the town of Mazar-e Sharif in northern Afghanistan, would oust the minority Tajik-backed Rabbani government and form a grand alliance with the Pushtuns. Such an alliance would make the road from Peshawar in western Pakistan to Central Asia via Kabul a most effective trade route. The opening of the trade route would introduce virgin Central Asia to the civilized world, and thus a huge "emerging market" would soon be delivered.

When such alliances failed to make any headway and quarrelling erupted over the anticipated loot, Dostum was written off as a spent force and Hekmatyar labelled a "corrupt Islamic fundamentalist." Then, last year, a "pure and zealous" Sunni religious group, known as the Taliban, was put together on the plains of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province and the adjoining, Pushtun-dominated areas of Afghanistan by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI); ISI has been the Pakistani handlers of the Afghan mujahideen since the days of the late President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq and Gen. Akhtar Abdur Rehman in the early eighties. The prediction was that the mighty sword of Islam wielded by the Taliban, would cut through the various factions in Afghanistan like a hot knife through butter.

The Taliban swept through the Pushtun areas of eastern and north-eastern Afghanistan, confronted and humbled the Shias of central Afghanistan, and stood at Kabul's door, atop tanks with Stingers and rocket launchers. No question, the pack of cards had been shuffled once more. Victories of the Taliban in eventful skirmishes were reported every day, and experts wrote the political obituaries of all the old, familiar strongmen.

But what seemed to be the hot story of Afghanistan in early 1995 began to cool by winter. Now, as we move into the spring of 1996, the holy warriors of the Taliban movement do not even secure news-blinks. Stripped of its quick glory, Taliban are now presented as an irrelevant force lost in the crags and ravines of Afghanistan. Once again, Hekmatyar and Dostum have been trotted out of the stable as the horses to watch, and in whose hands the future of Afghanistan rests.

Today we are back at square one, with no better understanding of events in Afghanistan: The much-emphasized Pushtun-Tajik animosity or the Pushtun-Uzbek rivalry, the subject of voluminous books, seem to be more a charade created for public consumption than the key to current developments. In fact, a closer look shows that the so-called Afghan civil war of the past eight years has less to do with the historical rivalries between contentious tribal groups and ethnic varieties, than with the elements introduced from outside during the nine years of holy war against the Soviet occupation.

War booty

The nine-year-long Afghan War (1980-88), or the period during which the Soviets tried unsuccessfully to consolidate their control over Afghanistan, was known to many around the world as the war to bleed the Reds to death. The West's ostensible objective of confronting the Soviet Army by training and arming the mujahideen guerrillas, was not simply to defeat the Soviet Army, but also to weaken the Soviet State. The Afghan War may yet emerge as immensely significant in world history, comparable, perhaps, in importance in the South and Central Asian region to the Vietnam War in South-east Asia.

The Soviet Army's reckless advance into Afghanistan to prop up its puppets in the winter of 1979 was seized upon instantly as the southern tier of the Arc of Crisis policy, and the opportunity to set up new instruments in a highly important strategic region.

As *EIR* extensively documented in its Oct. 13, 1995 issue, "New Terror International Targets South Asia," Afghan Aid U.K. (AAUK), together with Radio Free Kabul of London, were the two most important coordinators of Afghan mujahideen aid efforts throughout the war against the Soviets. Afghan Aid U.K., set up in Peshawar, Pakistan, had as its main sponsor Viscount Cranborne, Lord Privy Seal and leader of the House of the Lords. Its partner agency, Radio Free Kabul, had been created by Lord Nicholas Bethell, who worked with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to drum up U.S. support for the mujahideen.

Funds and organizing were not long in coming from the various factions in U.S. intelligence circles. In 1980, the Afghan Relief Committee, under the sponsorship of avowed LaRouche enemy John Train (see following article), was organized to channel funds primarily to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezbe Islami group. The Committee for a Free Afghan was also established, with Bethell the principal liaison from

London. The CFA concentrated its funding on Hekmatyar rival, Ahmed Shah Massoud. For the United States, the official covert operation allocation into the Afghan war was \$3 billion. In addition, huge sums of money were pumped in from Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations, building up assets within Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The murder on Jan. 25, 1993 of three CIA agents by the Afghansi Mir Aimal Kansi outside CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia, was one indication of a vast reorganization of the afghansi—especially those mujahideen from other countries—then taking place. And in fact, since then, the afghansi have trained their sites on London's targets—including the Bhutto government in Pakistan; the Philippines; France; and even the United States itself.

For the mujahideen warlords, the main part of the war booty was the narcotics money generated out of heroin and hashish trafficking from Afghanistan and western Pakistan. This part of the booty far overshadowed the money from Saudi Arabia and the war loot per se, and there was absolutely no one who did not dip into it to fill his pocket. Covert and not-so-covert operations from the West used this money to finance the mujahideen, and it is now the financing source for the afghansi internationally. For Pakistani intelligence, the management of drug trafficking generated a huge slush fund, which gave it the power to keep or remove governments in the capital, Islamabad, and to open new areas of conflict.

For the international narcotics traffickers and money launderers of Dope, Inc., the opportunity is wide open. The drug networks set up during the Afghan War are expanding by the day, and the Central Asian nations have already developed capabilities to become major drug suppliers and heroin manufacturers in the region. There is no question that the drug money will continue to nourish and nurture guerrilla groups like that of the Islamic Renaissance Party within Tajikistan, or Hekmatyar's Hezbe Islami, or Dostum's Uzbek militia, or Ahmed Shah Massoud's Tajik militia.

There exists very open cooperation among all these forces. For instance, the Tajik rebels ensconced in the northern Afghanistan refugee camps in Kunduz and Takhor, are under the control of Hekmatyar and Ahmed Shah Massoud, who are otherwise regarded as mortal enemies. These refugees, besides keeping up the terrorist pressure on the Tajikistan government of Emomali Rakhmanov in Dushanbe, play a major role in the drug-running operation through the Pamirs to Kyrgyzstan and beyond. Some of these Pamirs and Garmians have long been under the control of the CIA operatives who got them to participate in the Afghan War against the Soviets in support of Ahmed Shah Massoud.

This is the real story of the Afghan War, and its gory outcome: establishment of the monster called the "afghansis" on the basis of narcotics trafficking. And this is the real reason that, although the Soviet occupation is over, the Afghan War does not end. On the contrary, it is still in the early stages of claiming victims, and these are not simply Tajiks or Pushtuns

MAP 14

Tajik rebel camps in northern Afghanistan



Key to Map 14

1. Tajik refugee camp in Kunduz in northern Afghanistan, inhabited by Garmians, residents of Kugian-Tyube, and some Pamiris. The camp is under the control of Afghan mujahideen leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who uses the refugees for drug trafficking as well as to launch attacks on the Tajik government.
2. Tajik refugee camp in Takhar in northern Afghanistan. The camp includes Garmians and Pamiris. Besides drug trafficking, the camp is controlled by Afghan Defense Minister Ahmed Shah Massoud, a Tajik. Massoud uses the refugees to keep the Tajik government under pressure.

or Uzbeks, but entire nations in Central Asia that have emerged as independent republics following the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

No winners

While the drug money will have the strongest voice by far in Afghanistan, it is not unlikely that an arrangement can be reached whereby the powerful drug warlords can keep their "cuts" and operations intact.

In northern Afghanistan, the whole thing has come to a neat package. Here, Hekmatyar, in an attempt to undercut Ahmed Shah Massoud, a Tajik minority Afghan, is training and arming the Tajik rebels, who belonged to the late Tajikistan President, Rakhmon Nabyev. But reports from the area indicate that the opposition Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan has sent at least 20,000 Tajiks in support of Ahmed Shah Massoud, and the refugee camps at Takhor in northern Afghanistan are full of Tajiks backed by Massoud with money and arms.

Politically active clans in Tajikistan



Key to Map 15

1. Clan belongs to the southern province of Kurgian-Tyube. The clan was politicized when the Moscow-backed clans of Khodzhen and Kulyab took over Dushanbe. A large number of the clan moved south to the refugee camps in northern Afghanistan.
2. Pro-Soviet clan in Khodzhen (formerly Leninabad). Helped to put Emomali Rakhmanov in power.
3. Pro-Soviet clan in Kulyab joined hands with the Khodzhen clan to oust Islamists from Dushanbe.
4. Clan in Garm area. Backers of Islamic Renaissance party (IRP).
5. Sparsely populated Gorno-Badakhshan region, inhabited mostly by Ismaili Shias (also known as Aga Khanis).
6. Clan in Pamir Mountain area. Backers of IRP and Nationalist Rastokhez party.

At the same time, the Uzbek militia leader from Mazar-e Sharif, Gen. Abdur Rashid Dostum, who has definite commercial and intelligence links with Uzbekistan, has found it necessary, with the rise of the Taliban, to switch his support for Hekmatyar. On the other side, Hizbe Wahadat, the Shia party in Afghanistan, is now leaning in support of Massoud, as Pakistan is beginning to soften its stance towards the Rabbani government in Kabul. This was also reflected in the slow demise of the Taliban, and became evident when Pakistan reopened its embassy in Kabul in 1995. Pakistan is once again actively involved in trying to put together a coalition of Hekmatyar and Dostum to keep both Afghanistan and Tajikistan under pressure.

As a signal, Dostum had stepped up attacks in late 1995 on the Rabbani forces in the Khinjan Valley and Baghlan provinces. The attacks, by land and air, were ostensibly to

loosen Massoud's control over the Salang Highway, which is Kabul's main transport line north. Dostum's actions were in conjunction with the Taliban attempt to close off the Kabul-Kandahar Highway, Rabbani's main transport line south. At that point, it was reported that even Hekmatyar was trying to join the Taliban-Dostum clique and bring down the Rabbani government.

Exploding Tajikistan

Soon after the Soviet Army had dragged itself out of Afghanistan in 1988, conflicts in Tajikistan began to appear with unexpected, and unpublicized, virulence.

The three-year-long struggle between clans from backward regions such as Garm, Pamir, and Karategin, and the pro-Communist regime of Rakhmon Nabiyeu, backed by the pro-Russian clans from Khodzhen and the capital, Dushanbe, under the banner of the Popular Front came to a head in 1991.

In 1991, young people strongly opposed to the regime of Kakhor Makhkamov, then first secretary of the Central Committee, formed the Democratic Party of Tajikistan and recruited the Garmians and Pamirs. Another party, the National Rastokhez Party, also made its appearance around the same time, in the same area. Also about the same time, the Islamic Renaissance Party was formed, which drew support from the peasants of southern province of Kurgian Tyube, known for its economic backwardness.

In May 1992, after years of low-intensity warfare, a coalition of Democrats and Islamists moved in, emerging victorious. Safarali Kendjayev, the leader of the Popular Front, fled Dushanbe and the 201st Russian motorized rifle division was brought in to maintain peace in the capital. President Nabiyeu, in his efforts to maintain law and order, began working with the Democrat-Islamist coalition.

However, Nabiyeu, having compromised politically, was pushed out in September 1992 and a new consensus leader, Akbarsho Iskandrov, took over. In October 1992, Kendjayev, armed with Uzbek arms and tanks, invaded Dushanbe: The period of implosion was over, and Tajikistan then began to explode.

In November 1992, at the height of Tajikistan's civil war, 60,000 people were reportedly killed. At this point, Emomali Rakhmanov was elected the Parliament Speaker, and consequently head of the republic, at the Tajik Supreme Soviet session held at Khodzhen. At the same session Sangak Safarov, commander of the Armed Forces of the ousted Popular Front, moved in. Safarov, with a long criminal record, had earlier spent 23 years in prison.

In mid-December, the Islamists, backed by Rakhmanov, Safarov, and the narco-traffickers, began their effort to seize power in Dushanbe. Their first objective was to rush the prisons in the outskirts of the capital, and release hundreds of prisoners serving long sentences for grave crimes.

Strengthened further by the criminals, the Islamists lodged themselves in Kofirnikhon near Dushanbe, until the Popular Front and the Tajik government, in a joint operation,

pushed the Islamists back about 80 kilometers, to the western edge of the Pamirs in the Ramit Gorge and in the southern Kurgian-Tyube and Kulyab region.

A series of murders followed: On the night of April 12, 1993 Rakhmon Nabiyeu, the former Tajikistan President and long-serving first secretary of its Communist Party, died in obscure circumstances.

Two weeks earlier, there was a fierce shootout near the town of Kurgian-Tyube between the political and military leaders of the Popular Front of Tajikistan, Sangak Safarov and Fayzali Saidov, killing them both. In early March, a military force belonging to Saidov marched into Dushanbe. Saidov's men surrounded the Interior Ministry with their tanks and presented Interior Minister Yakub Salimov with an ultimatum demanding "some leading positions" in the ministry.

Soon after, Sangak Safarov (who had bestowed upon himself the dubious honor of being the "Father of the Tajik Nation"), appeared on the scene, demanding Saidov disband his men. The negotiations turned into a heated argument, eventually resulting in the deadly shootout.

Politics of refuge

While the death of such notables as Nabiyeu, Saidov, and Safarov have been highlighted in the media, in reality, more than 100,000 lives have been lost in the Tajik civil war and another 800,000 have left Tajikistan to live in camps in northern Afghanistan and Uzbekistan.

In northern Afghanistan, at least a half-dozen large refugee camps have been set up to lodge the fleeing Tajiks. Reports indicate that these camps are under control of one or the other Afghan "strongman." These strongmen, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Ahmed Shah Massoud, and Gen. Abdur Rashid Dostum, use the refugees to exert pressure on the governments in Tajikistan or Uzbekistan, and to enhance drug-trafficking operations.

Camps in Balkh and Samangan, under the control of the National Islam Movement and General Dostum, are under the supervision of the U.N. High Commission for Refugees. Camps in Konduz and Takhor, under the control of Hekmatyar and Ahmed Shah Massoud, have little U.N. supervision, and it has been reported that the refugees of these two camps are in the forefront of guerrilla activities within Tajikistan. It is also known widely that Massoud was backing Nabiyeu with arms and other matériel against the Emomali Rakhmanov government. In fact, some claim that the two actually linked up much earlier, when Massoud was battling the Soviet Army in northern Afghanistan.

Also of interest is the constitution of these refugee camps. Both the Konduz and Takhor camps are heavily inhabited by the backward clans from Garm, Pamir, and Gorno-Badakhshan, with a smattering of Kurgian-Tyube and Kulyab clans. Balkh and Samangan camps have large number of refugees who were living in the southwestern areas of Tajikistan bordering Uzbekistan.

What is relevant about this level of detail, is that a large

number of Gorno-Badakhshanis are Ismaili Shias loyal to Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan. Sadruddin Aga Khan, besides being the leader of this sect, is a career bureaucrat, and the former coordinator of U.N. Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programs relating to Afghanistan (see *EIR*, Oct. 13, 1995). Sadruddin Aga Khan is now all over that region, covering Afghanistan, and the refugee camps in the Pakistani provinces of North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan and Balkh, and Afghani provinces of Samangan, Kunduz and Takhor. It is no surprise, then, that the Aga Khan's followers, or Ismaili Shias, are a major political, terrorist, and drug-trafficking unit in Central Asia.

Future explosions

After a lull of almost three years, during which low-intensity warfare was taking lives in ones and twos, yet another situation is fast emerging where large-scale bloodbaths will be the order of the day.

The first major bad news surfaced last September, when it became evident that two military units belonging to the Tajik Defense Ministry were clashing in the area of Kurgian-Tyube. First Deputy Chairman of the Tajik Defense Ministry, Aleksandr Chubarev admitted this in an interview with Russia's Itar-Tass news agency. It was reported that the First Army Brigade stationed in Kurgian-Tyube used tanks and artillery to seize the territory of the neighboring 11th Military Unit. The ensuing clash killed at least 30 people, but unofficial reports put the number as high as 200. It is also reported that the 11th Military Unit is not resigned to let this armed attack by the First Army Brigade pass. What is also evident is that thousands of residents fled to refugee camps in northern Afghanistan in the wake of the armed clash.

The clandestine Voice of Free Tajikistan, allegedly broadcast from Takhor refugee camps in northern Afghanistan and which voices the views of both Massoud and Hekmatyar, said on one occasion that the government had lost control of the former Popular Front of the brothers-in-arms Safarali Kendjayev and Sangak Safarov. If this state of affairs continues, the broadcast warned, the possibility of military takeover will exist in Kabul.

Two other events of substance have occurred: Warlords from Tursunzade, west of Dushanbe, formerly loyal to the Tajik government, have attacked the cities of Tursunzade and Kurgian-Tyube. Former Tursunzade Mayor Ibod Boimatov, supported by 300 cadres, two tanks and two armored personnel carriers entered Tajikistan from Uzbekistan and captured the aluminum factory in the city on Jan. 26. In Kurgian-Tyube, Mahmud Khudaberdiyev, commander of the First Brigade, took control of the police station and government buildings. Both Khudaberdiyev and Boimatov have demanded that the Rakhmanov government resign.

On the night of Jan. 21, the pro-Moscow spiritual leader of Tajikistan Mufti Fatkhulla Sharipov was machine-gunned down at his home west of Dushanbe. The Mufti was considered a key element in the upcoming talks between various

Tajik factions scheduled to be held in Ashgabad, Turkmenistan, under U.N. observation. Mufti supported the Emomali Rakhmanov government. It is no surprise that the talks failed afterwards.

It is not clear as yet who killed the Mufti. But there is no question that many Tajik observers believe that opposition leader Akbar Turadzhonzoda, who is based in Peshawar, Pakistan, is a beneficiary of the Mufti's death. He has denied any involvement of the opposition in the assassination. However, Tajik government agencies believe that the killers came from the south, from refugee camps across the border. President Rakhmanov is quoted in a Moscow public TV broadcast on Jan. 22 saying, "Show them which Islamic States are training these terrorists. Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan train them specially to terrorize the Tajik people. They feed them, they pay them. Show them, and let the international community know."

It is obvious that the institutionless Tajikistan, rife with clan rivalries and past animosities, flush with drug money, arms and ill-wishers, and left in the lurch by the rest of the world, cannot prevent another slaughter. It is coming, and there is possibly nothing that can be done to prevent it.

On the other hand, a military solution is out of the question. It would further destabilize the region, as hundreds of thousands of refugees will pour out through the porous borders and set up refugee camps. These refugee camps will breed more killers, drug-runners, and bounty-hunters. At some point, the conflict will flow into the heart of the neighboring nations. None of the Central Asian nations has the resilience to absorb these forces of instability or has the ability to eradicate them.

Originators of the afghansi

Lord Nicholas Bethell: Lord Bethell had been the main international promoter of western aid to the Afghan mujahideen in the early phases of the Afghan civil war, with his Radio Free Kabul, run out of Coutts, Queen Elizabeth's bank. At the time of his death in 1992, Lord Bethell had become a key player in supporting the Georgian side of the war with Abkhazia. A former lord-in-waiting to Queen Elizabeth II, Lord Bethell had served in the Mideast and Soviet sections of MI-6, working closely with Kim Philby, the British triple agent who "defected" to the Soviet Union in 1963.

Viscount Cranborne (Robert Cecil): Lord Privy Seal (chief of the Queen's Privy Council) and Leader of the House of Lords, Viscount Cranborne had been a primary organizer and overseer of the first phase of the civil war in Afghanistan (1979-88), carried out under the cover of his Afghan Aid U.K.

Throughout the Afghan war, this organization preferentially financed and supplied the forces of the current Afghan Defense Minister Ahmed Shah Massoud, of Tajik ethnic-origin. Massoud today oversees the Tajik insurgents and narcotics traffickers operating out of refugee camps in northern Afghanistan.

The viscount is a member of the Cecil family, one of the oldest and most powerful oligarchical families in Britain. His great-grandfather, the Third Marquis of Salisbury, was the turn-of-the-century British prime minister and foreign secretary, who oversaw efforts to destroy both the Ottoman and Russian empires, including through patronizing ethnic insurgencies, such as the Armenians. Viscount Cranborne's grandfather, the Fifth Marquis, had been a World War II colonial secretary.

John Train: Wall Street banker and covert operations specialist. A descendant of a New England family that made its money as a junior partner in the nineteenth-century British opium trade. John Train played an important role in the 1980s Afghan war through his Afghanistan Relief Committee (ARC), which he chaired, and which was housed in his banking firm.

In April 1983, Train formed a media salon whose task was to coordinate a media slander campaign against *EIR*'s founder Lyndon LaRouche. The first meeting of the group followed President Ronald Reagan's announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative, based on LaRouche's proposal, which was violently opposed by British intelligence and allied U.S. families. Leo Cherne's Freedom House, and other allied "Project Democracy" organizations were central to this campaign. Another component of this salon, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, had earlier been deployed against LaRouche following *EIR*'s publication of the book *Dope Inc.*, which documented the role the Anglo-American establishment families in overseeing the illegal drug trade.

One of the main operations of the salon was charging that LaRouche oversaw the 1986 assassination of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme. The slander also served to divert investigations from evidence pointing to the Swedish-based Emma Rothschild, and the Bofors arms-trafficking interests active in Bush's Iran-Contra dealings. Train was well suited for this task, having long had close ties to Sweden-through his first wife, Maria Teresa Cini di Pianzana, a product of the intermarriage of one of the top Venetian oligarchical families with one of the leading Swedish noble families.

Train also has business ties to Sweden. PK Banken of Sweden's subsidiary, English Association Trust (EAT) of London, is the primary stockholder in Train's investment bank, Train, Smith counsel. PK Banken is a partnership between the Swedish government and industrialist Erik Penser, the primary stockholder in Nobel Industries, owner of Bofors. The chairman of EAT is Richard Cox-Johnson, formerly a merchant banker with N.M. Rothschild.

Development or free trade?

In 1989, American statesman Lyndon LaRouche put forward a plan for the infrastructural upgrading of the European continent—centered on a “Productive Triangle” inscribed from Paris, Berlin, and Vienna—as the basis for the urgently required development of eastern Europe and Russia. In 1992, *EIR* published an extension of this program—“Eurasian Alliance for Infrastructure: Key to World Peace”—which proposed a “new Silk Route” from Europe to Asia (see **Map 16**, overleaf). The plan proposed the revival of the ancient routes of land travel which linked east and west, the route which linked the great civilizations of the Sung dynasty of China with the flourishing Islamic civilization of West Asia, and into Europe.

The Mongol invasion of Central Asia in the thirteenth century destroyed these civilizations and leveled the great cities of Central Asia. Soviet colonialism also left the economies of the republics of Central Asia at such a degraded level, that Central Asian infant mortality rates were as high as those of sub-Saharan Africa.

The construction of a new Silk Route today would link the vast regions of the Eurasian land mass, currently cut off by major physical barriers and by war zones. The rail lines would also function as the driving force for development across the entire continent.

This is because, as the history of the development of the United States proved, rail lines not only function as the circu-

latory system for a national and global economy, but are the backbone for internal development. The rail lines proposed are not simple transport grids, but are designed as *infrastructure corridors*—the lines along which population and energy density reach levels critical enough to power industrialization. Arrayed on either side of the rail line are nuclear-powered urban-industrial complexes—nuplexes—surrounded by areas of intensive agriculture. High-input, intensive agriculture takes advantage of the nuclear technology process for irrigation and fertilizer production.

The land area of a 50-kilometer corridor on each side of the lines proposed for the Silk Route Lines A, B, and C, already encompasses between 800 and 900 million people—about 25% of the entire population of Eurasia and more than 50% of its industrial workforce. Given that Eurasia comprises more than three-fifths of the world's population, the Silk Route concept is the physical basis for reconstruction of the current dilapidated world economy.


But London has had other ideas. The Central Asian republics, as with Russia itself and the eastern European nations, are being treated to the same array of policies as the British colonialists imposed on India in the eighteenth century: forced deindustrialization, extraction of natural resources, and the incorporation into a global enterprise of drug cultivation and trafficking—the very policies for which Adam Smith was the hired apologist.



An open-air market in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, as it appeared during the Soviet era about 20 years ago. This capital, which once enjoyed a flourishing Islamic civilization and is now rapidly becoming a major opium-growing center, lies on the northern branch of Line B of the proposed Eurasian rail grid, right in the middle of the “new Silk Route” from Europe to Asia.

The LaRouche 'land-bridge' proposal for Eurasian development





The 'Great Game' and the pipeline wars

by William Engdahl

A battle has been raging since the collapse of the Soviet Union over control of oil reserves in and adjoining the Caspian Sea, believed to be the largest untapped oil reserves found since those of the Alaska North Slope some 25 or so years ago.

The fight over the region, which, for almost a century, was the heart of Britain's "Great Game" geopolitical manipulations to control Central Asia and contain Russia, has pulled into its vortex every State in the region from Russia to Turkey to Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. The strategic tug-of-war is being fought over decisions on the routing of pipelines to carry oil from the Tengiz field in Kazakhstan and the offshore fields near Baku in Azeri waters. The British Foreign Office and the interests tied to the House of Windsor, with a strong traditional interest in Royal Dutch Shell, have covertly backed such interests in the region as the mysterious Oman Oil Company, in order to maximize chaos and to deny a strong American role.

Pipeline politics

According to geophysical experts, the Caspian Sea Basin and adjacent land areas form one of the richest unexplored oil and gas reserves outside the Middle East, holding billions of barrels of crude oil, and some of the world's largest reserves of natural gas. Western oil companies, including Chevron, BP, Amoco, and Shell, are actively seeking to build a major stake in the area, with potential investment in the tens of billions of dollars. Oil and gas reserves are concentrated in the offshore Caspian waters of Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan, as well as in the huge Tengiz field in far west Kazakhstan, and the world's fourth largest natural gas reserves, in Turkmenistan.

Unlike Russian oil and gas reserves, the Caspian fields are shallow and relatively easy to exploit, making them cheaper to develop. The critical issue is what route pipelines should take to market the oil and gas abroad.

Here is where the battle begins (see **Map 17**). Not only does Russia border the Caspian Sea, but also Iran. Present oil pipelines pass through embattled Grozny in Chechnya. Russia insists on having future oil export, from both Baku and Tengiz fields, pass through Russian territory. Not surprisingly, the

Central Asian republics as well as Turkey, have other ideas.

Russia would clearly like the Caspian Basin oil all to be piped to the Russian port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea, and from there by tanker to Bulgaria and on to Greece for Western marketing. This complex route would prevent the oil's passing through rival Turkey.

Russian-Turkish relations are not exactly cordial on the topic. Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller recently told Moscow that Turkey would refuse passage rights to any more large oil tankers passing through the Bosphorus from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, claiming environmental danger of oil spills as the reason, and threatening to allow Greenpeace to stage protests there. Moscow replies that this is merely an excuse for Turkey, and that the real reason is to force the Central Asia pipelines to route overland through Turkey, in place of Russia.

In Kazakhstan, where the American oil major, Chevron, has been active for four years in the Super-Giant Tengiz field, the pipeline deadlock has now all but forced Chevron to halt activity. The field is Chevron's largest new project since first opening Saudi Arabia 50 years ago. But pipeline politics may ruin that. Kazakhstan has formed a consortium, Caspian Pipeline Consortium, whose members include the Kazakh and Russian State oil companies, Chevron, and the Oman Oil Co. The inclusion of Oman is the bizarre factor which Chevron claims is preventing a pipeline solution.

The Russians are demanding a pipeline from Tengiz through Russia to Novorossiysk to replace the presently overloaded Friendship Pipeline that goes through Russia. Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev is being advised in his negotiations with Chevron by a mysterious Dutch oil trader, John Deuss, who also is president of Oman Oil Co.

Deuss enjoys close ties to the Sultan of Oman, perhaps the most anglophile of the Gulf rulers, a man trained at Britain's Sandhurst military academy, who takes policy guidance from a "retired" British Air Force Marshal, Sir Erik Bennett. The sultan was a major supplier to the Afghan mujahideen.

One of Deuss's partners in this venture is Ted Shackley, a former speechwriter for George Bush. Shackley also has a long history in the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. He was involved in both Vietnam and the Bay of Pigs before being named deputy chief of clandestine operations in the mid-1970s. In that post, he was the boss of such people as Gen. Richard Secord of Iran-Contra notoriety; Secord won a contract in 1991 to train the Azerbaijan military.

Deuss and Shackley spent six months in Kazakhstan in 1993 to win a deal, but the clincher was when Deuss managed to get a \$100 million "loan" to Nazarbayev from the Oman Sultanate. Since then, Deuss has held the dual role of adviser to the Kazakh government on the oil project, and head of Oman Oil.

In the fall of 1995, Chevron announced that it was scaling back investment in the Tengiz field because of the pipeline

The contesting oil and gas pipelines



Key to Map 17

Conflicting schemes of oil and gas development of the Caucasus and Central Asia have been astutely used by the British to manipulate and inflame ethnic conflict, and to attempt to prepare a Russian-Turkish showdown. Insurgencies in Chechnya, Azerbaijan, Abkhazia, and the Kurdish region of Turkey have blocked all oil development, as have the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and threatened conflict in Xinjiang, China.

Line 1 is an existing oil pipeline that could pump oil from the Baku Caspian Sea oil fields, and the newly developed Tengiz fields in Kazakhstan, to the Russian port Novorossiysk on the Black Sea. British-sponsored conflict in Chechnya, through which the pipeline runs, has made this route unattractive. The Chechens have recently bombed the pipeline and refineries in the region.

Line 2 is a proposed pipeline running through Azerbaijan and Georgia. The line would run through the Kuma River valley, nearby Karabakh, and would end at the port city of Poti,

nearby Abkhazia. Armenian or Abkhazian forces could destroy the proposed pipeline at any time.

Lines 3 and 4 are two proposed pipelines pumping oil from Baku to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Both had been proposed as alternatives to the existing line through Russia. Both variants could be blocked by the Armenians or the Kurdish insurgents in eastern Anatolia at any time.

Line 5 is a proposed pipeline which would pump natural gas from the Tengiz field in Kazakhstan via China, for Japan. It is vulnerable to Uighur insurgency in Xinjiang, China, organized by Britain, primarily out of Turkey.

Line 6 is a proposed pipeline which would pump natural gas from Turkmenistan via Central Asia and Xinjiang province, for Japan. It is vulnerable to the same insurgencies.

Lines 7 and 8 would pump natural gas to Pakistan and India. Continuing conflict in Afghanistan makes this line impossible.

Lines 9 and 10, which would run through Iran, have been blocked by political pressure.

impasse, citing Deuss's obstructive role. Deuss and Oman, influencing as well Kazakhstan's vote in the consortium, propose constructing a new pipeline to Novorossiysk. Chevron had agreed to finance half the entire cost in return for only 25% interest in the pipeline. Oman's Deuss pressed for Chevron to pay 100%, some \$1.4 billion, for only 33% interest, permitting Deuss a risk-free 33% share for himself. At that point Chevron cut back dramatically. Without Western funds, the impoverished Kazakhstan government is unlikely to be able to finance the project.

The Baku factor

The second crossroads of Central Asian pipeline politics involves Azerbaijan, one of the world's first major oil regions, discovered back in the 1870s and pioneered by Sweden's Nobel brothers. The offshore waters near Baku hold enormous reserves of untapped oil, at least comparable to those of Tengiz, according to geologists.

One person with a prime interest in this oil is Mark Thatcher, the globe-trotting oil and weapons-salesman son of former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. According to a Russian source, Thatcher is capitalizing on the contacts set up for him by his mother. Officially, "Thatcher works for British Petroleum, and the BP-led consortium that is arranging the oil deals with Azerbaijan. He's close to the son of Heidar Aliyev, who's chairman of the Azeri State oil company."

Even with Thatcher's son for an ally, Azerbaijan still has the problem of how to get the oil out.

On Jan. 18, 1996, Russia and Azerbaijan signed an oil transit agreement which guarantees that "at least 5 million tons of oil a year" will flow through a Russian pipeline managed by Transneft by 2002. The route goes through Dagestan and Chechnya. However, the visit of British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind to Azerbaijan Jan. 3 had already begun tugging events in the opposite direction.

In mid-January, Chechen terrorist provocations dramatically escalated the war in Chechnya. As one European military analyst noted at the time to *EIR*, "The matter of oil flow is quite crucial to the Caucasus conflict. At the moment, there are all sorts of agreement for the northern route for the oil to flow, through Russia. But if this war continues, or expands, the international oil consortium will press for the route through Turkey."

The point has not been lost on Russia. A well-informed Russian source averred to *EIR* that Turkey's encouraging disposition in the hijacking of a ferryboat by Chechen terrorists in the Turkish port of Trabzon, was motivated by the desire to create a "provocation in the Bosphorus," causing such "mischief" that "the idea of sending Azeri and Kazakh oil from Novorossiysk in Russia, through the Bosphorus, becomes impossible." He reported that the international oil consortium developing oil in Azerbaijan, led by Exxon and British Petroleum, had sent a "letter of information" informing

the Russian government that if it is not possible to send "light oil" through the Chechen capital of Grozny by April 1996, then the consortium would send it through Georgia and then via Turkey.

Nor has the point been lost on the Chechens. On Feb. 23, casting their vote for British Petroleum, Chechen terrorists blew up a gas pipeline along the Chechen-Dagestan border, and destroyed an oil refinery in Grozny. BBC cited Jonathan Lee, of the London Center for Global Energy Studies, as saying, "This is the last thing the Russians want, because it will make their negotiations with the Azeri oil consortium all the more difficult."

Moscow geopolitics

For the Russian view of this matter, *EIR* spoke with Prof. Grigori Bondarevsky of the Institute of Social-Political Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Bondarevsky, one of the world's authorities on Muslim Central Asia, was blunt: "Turkey is playing a very problematic role in these complex pipeline negotiations."

This is why Russia insists on the Novorossiysk-Bulgaria route, to avoid Turkey entirely. Moscow is apparently prepared to use strong measures to secure this option. "Of course," Bondarevsky stated, "if Turkey persists in its demand, there are options which could be used to pressure Turkey." He noted the presence of large numbers of Kurds in the very region where the Ciller government would have to route the oil pipeline. "In the 1920s, the Kurds helped Armenia against the Azeris. The Kurds could well respond today again to the unreasonable pipeline project of the Turkish government."

Strained relations between Turkey and Russia, including the contention over pipeline routing, have also played a significant role in the recent improvement of relations between Iran and Moscow. Bondarevsky indicated. "Russia has improving relations with Iran." Citing the controversial deal to deliver Russian nuclear power technology to Teheran, along with Russian submarines, he added, "Russia needs Iran against Turkey." Notably, in late 1995, Iran backed Russian demands that, according to an old 1936 treaty between Iran and the Soviet Union, all countries bordering the Caspian Sea have joint rights to the region's resources, including Russia.

Moscow is also playing a typically Russian pressure game. They are part of the Central Asia Economic Union, but Moscow is holding out blackmail that it will encourage Russian technical cadre and engineers to flee Kazakhstan, for example, if that country tries to go it alone on the oil pipeline. Without Russian engineers and technicians, most oil and gas, and other industrial operations in the Central Asian republics, would soon grind to a halt.

The pipeline wars exemplify the "tightrope" confronting the Central Asian republics, stretched between trying to accommodate Moscow on one side, while seeking more independent ties with neighbors such as Turkey on the other.

Dope, Inc.'s Afghan harvest

by Ramtanu Maitra

The latest figures from the International Narcotics Control Board, published by the United Nations for 1995, and the *Supply of Illicit Drugs to the United States*, published in 1995 by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), show that during 1994-95, cultivated illicit opium production in Afghanistan was about 2,300 tons, about one-third less than in crop year 1993-94. The decrease is attributed to large-scale eradication, lower prices because of overproduction in 1993-94, and increased cultivation cost.

Some of the drop in production was also caused by the effective border control and the fight against drug trafficking by both Iran and Pakistan during 1994-95. Illicit opium production, however, shows a rise in the northeastern Afghan province of Badakshan bordering Tajikistan. The United Nations report attributes this increase to the emerging new trafficking and opening up of fresh routes through neighboring members of the Community of Independent States (CIS) of Central Asia.

Today the "Taliban interlude," during which it was reported that the religious believers belonging to the movement were involved in curbing poppy growing, has come to a halt, and a new surge of trafficking is expected from the region.

The CIS member states in Central Asia, Gorno-Badakhshan in southeastern Tajikistan, Penjikent (at the Tajik-Kyrgyz border), Taldy-Kurgan and Kazyl-Orda (both in southern Kazakhstan), and the Samarkand area in central Uzbekistan are fast becoming major poppy-growing areas. One estimate claims that the Chu River valley in Kazakhstan and the Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan can produce as much opium and hashish as that produced around the world now.

In Central Asia, poppy growing is still done in smaller plots. In 1994, some 400 hectares of illicit poppy were eradicated in Penjikent, and "Operation Mak" in northern Tajikistan resulted in the seizure of some 200 tons of opium and cannabis resin and in the arrest of dozens of well-armed drug gangs. The government of Uzbekistan has continued with its manual poppy eradication program (known as the "Black Poppy" operations), resulting in eradication on average of 150 tons of opium poppy plants and 25 tons of cannabis plants per year.

Meanwhile, another CIS member-nation, Georgia, is turning fast into a major poppy-growing country.

In the 1980s, when Washington was leaning on Pakistan heavily to become the major cog in its Afghan war machine, and lavishly dumping aid on Pakistan and the government of its military dictator Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, heroin-manufacturing labs began to crop up all along the Durand Line which separates Pakistan from Afghanistan. In an interview, General Zia himself admitted that about 19 heroin labs were converting opium into heroin on the Pakistani side of the border.

As long as the Soviets were in Afghanistan, most of the Afghan opium and heroin would find its way into Pakistan and then through various smuggling networks transit through India and Nepal into the West. However, the scene has changed since. A recent news report from Alma Ata, the Kazakhstan capital, by André Grabot of the Agence France Presse, is an eye-opener. He pointed out that the new drug routes, alternatives to the well-known outlets of Karachi or the Makrana coast, are along the narrow and winding tracks over the Pamir Mountain range in Tajikistan used by caravans and herdsmen. In certain places, the caravan climbs over

MAP 18

Poppy-growing areas in Central Asia



MAP 19

Known heroin laboratories in Central Asia



6,000 meters on its way to Moscow en route to the West.

The caravan stops at Osh, the second largest city in Kyrgyzstan, and now a major hub of drugs coming in from Afghanistan and Tajikistan, as well as from local production. Osh is located deep in the Ferghana Valley on the border with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In Kyrgyzstan, to the north of Tajikistan, the drug trade is growing by leaps and bounds. According to Kyrgyz Interior Ministry statistics, in 1991, police seized just 3.5 kilos of opium and 5 kilos the following year; but in 1993 the haul shot up to 153 kilos, and in 1994 the seizure crossed the one-ton barrier.

However, these seizures are not even a drop in the bucket compared to the sea of poppy growing now in progress in the region. Western diplomats report that the road between Tashkent and Samarkand in Uzbekistan goes between the mountains, the sides of which have been cultivated. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration has also identified the Central Asian states within the CIS as major poppy-growing regions. The DEA says the Central Asian officials do not have statistics on the extent of the cultivation.

MAP 20

Marijuana and hashish production areas in Central Asia



Key to Map 20

- About 170,000 hectares in Kazakhstan produce cannabis
- About 6,000 hectares in Kyrgyzstan produce cannabis
- Cannabis grows wild in Tajikistan

On the manufacturing end, the reports indicate the following:

- Traffickers from Afghanistan are shipping metric-ton quantities of morphine base by maritime vessels and overland through Central Asia to Turkey for further processing into heroin.


- While most of the acetic anhydride used to make heroin by the laboratory operators is smuggled into Pakistan from India, Kazakhstan is emerging as a major manufacturer of acetic anhydride and there are reports of the chemical traveling to clandestine heroin-manufacturing labs located along the Afghanistan-Tajikistan borders.

- The DEA report indicates that opiate processing has increased during 1994-95 in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. There are indications that heroin laboratory activity increased, possibly to supply traffickers using routes through Central Asia and Russia.

- Many laboratories are located in the northern part of Afghanistan, in close proximity to its borders with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. For the supply of acetic anhydride, these labs depend on Kazakhstan.

- Finally, the United Nations report says that in Afghanistan, clandestine heroin laboratories are on the increase.

Heroin and opium trail through Central Asia

**Key to Map 21**

Route 1: Opium, mostly from Herat, Afghanistan to Turkey, for processing into heroin.

Route 2: Heroin from northern Afghanistan and Tajikistan to western Europe through Estonia and Latvia.

Route 3: Heroin from northern Afghanistan transported through Tashkent, Uzbekistan to western Europe, via Moscow and Tallinn, Estonia. This route feeds Chechnya as well.

Route 4: Heroin from northern Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan to western Europe via St. Petersburg.